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Litigators and Dealmakers:  
A Comprehensive Critique of the California 
Labor Commission’s Solis Decision and the 
Talent Agencies Act in the Context of the  







INT. BEVERLY HILTON HOTEL - DAY 
At 3:00 in the afternoon on April 12, 2019, adversaries in pressed power 
suits glare at each other across a large table. The situation is tense. On one 
side are representatives for the Writers Guild of America, the largest union 
for television and film writers in America. On the other side are negotiators 
for the Association of Talent Agencies, the most important professional 
organization for talent agents. The franchise agreement binding these two 
groups expires at midnight. And this room is about to explode. 
 
FLASHBACK TO: 
EXT. HOLLYWOOD – ONE YEAR EARLIER. 
As spring comes to Hollywood in 2018, the town prepares for an annual 
tradition known as staffing season. Typically, this time of year is when the 
symbiotic relationship between writers in the motion picture industry and 
their agents is most potent. Agents prove their worth as marketers for their 
clients, finding meetings for them at television networks, and buyers for their 
work at the studios. Writers try to impress showrunners, producers, and 
corporate executives. But 2018 is different. Something simmers under the 
surface and Hollywood buzzes. 
Writers malign their representatives, complaining about so-called 
“packaging” deals. The scribes criticize their agencies for creating 
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attorney at Conlee Schmidt & Emerson LLP with an entertainment practice specializing in 
film and television. He is licensed in Kansas and California and represents writers and 
producers across the Great Plains and southern California. He wishes to thank Jeff Emerson 
and Kari Schmidt for their encouragement and thoughtful criticism. The author has never been 
affiliated with a talent agency, guild or labor union. 
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“conflicts-of-interest.” The whispers get loud enough that the Writers Guild 
can no longer ignore them. Conversations are had. A vote is called. And in 
April 2018, the Guild notifies the Association that the writers are terminating 
the franchise agreement. The termination takes effect in twelve months.1 
Over the following months, the Association and Guild engage in talks 
to negotiate a new franchise agreement. However, the Guild does not wait. 
It drafts a new franchise agreement, which includes a new code of conduct 
for the talent agents: the Code of Conduct/Franchise Agreement of 2019 
(herein “CCFA”).2 In February 2019, the Guild presents it to the 
Association.3 This new franchise agreement takes a hard line on the 
conflicts-of-interest which prompted the Guild to terminate the prior 
franchise agreement.4 The Association is furious, and the Guild anticipates 
that talent agents will refuse to come to the table. Hoping not to leave its 
members without competent representation if the talent agents refuse to sign 
on to the new terms, the Guild issues what shortly would become known as 
the delegation letter. Therein, the writers’ union advises its membership to 
use their attorneys to “fill some of the gap” in representation that may occur 
if the talent agents refuse to sign onto the new CCFA.5 
 
SMASH CUT BACK TO: 
BEVERLY HILTON CONFERENCE ROOM – APRIL 12, 2019 
The negotiators for the writers and the agents eyeball each other. The 
franchise agreement expires at midnight. The CCFA, having been ratified by 
the WGA only two weeks earlier, takes effect at one minute past.6  The 
writers give the agents this one last opportunity to negotiate the terms of a 
new franchise agreement in good faith. But in true Hollywood style, it takes 
only an hour for negotiations to melt down in epic fashion. By 4:00 o’clock, 
 
 1.  Rebecca Sun & Jonathan Handel, As Talent Agencies Push to Own Content, Some 
Creators Cry Foul, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 12, 2018, 6:40 AM), https://www.holly 
woodreporter.com/features/talent-agencies-push-production-rankles-wga-some-clients-
1142009. 
 2.  Writers Guild of Am., Code of Conduct/Franchise Agreement of 2019, 
https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/06/wga_verve_code_of_ 
conduct_franchise_agreement_5-16-19.pdf [hereinafter WGA CCFA]. 
 3.  David Robb. WGA Invites Agents To Sign Its New Code Of Conduct Banning 
Packaging and Producing, DEADLINE (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:47 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/ 
02/wga-invites-agents-to-sign-its-new-code-of-conduct-banning-packaging-and-producing-
1202562512/. 
 4.  WGA CCFA at § 3(A)(1)(“Agent shall at all times act as a fiduciary of Writer, and 
shall comply with all fiduciary duties imposed by statute or common law”); see also WGA 
CCFA at § 3(B). 
 5.  Dave McNary, Writers Guild Preps Members for Life Without Agents, Debuts 
Submission System, VARIETY (Apr. 1, 2019, 4:33 PM), https://variety.com/2019/tv/news/ 
writers-guild-debuts-submission-system-1203177953/. 
 6.  Robb, supra note 3. 
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the meeting craters after a series of “testy exchanges” and threats of legal 
action.7 The parties retreat to their respective headquarters, and by 4:30, the 
Guild blasts an e-mail to its members reminding them the CCFA takes effect 
at midnight.8 The Guild adds one simple mandate: fire your agents if they 
refuse to sign the new franchise agreement. Over the weekend, 7,000 of the 
8,800 active writers in the Guild suddenly become unrepresented.9 
But even without their traditional middlemen, business goes on. The 
studios and networks have television shows to staff and feature films need 
scriptwriters for development. They have writing positions to fill. And 
writers still need those jobs. Thousands of writers wade into murky waters. 
They look for jobs through hastily-put-together Guild-generated job posting 
boards, informal mixers where they can meet with showrunners and 
producers, and Twitter campaigns like #WGAStaffing Boost and 
#WGAMIX to find the work they had, until then, relied on their agents to 
find.10 But once these offers are made, who is to negotiate them on behalf of 
the writers? 
 
II. Agents, Attorneys and the Packaging Wars 
 
A. Writers, Agents, and The Franchise Agreement 
 
On one side of this dispute are the writers, represented by the Writers 
Guild of America (herein, the “Guild” or “WGA”). The Guild is actually 
comprised of two independent but affiliated labor unions, the Writers Guild 
of America, West (WGAw) and the Writers Guild of America, East (WGAe). 
These two organizations are so closely aligned that they are often 
collectively referred to simply as a single union: “the” Writers Guild of 
America. Formed in the 1950s, the WGA wields substantial influence in the 
entertainment industry as the collective bargaining representative of almost 
30,000 active and inactive members,11 including showrunners (chief writers 
 
 7.  Cynthia Littleton, Sparks Flew in WGA-ATA Meeting as Negotiations Cratered, 
VARIETY (Apr. 12, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/wga-ata-contract-
fight-code-of-conduct-1203188786/. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Jonathan Handel, Over 7,000 Writers Fire Their Agents as New Reality Takes Hold, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 22, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
news/7000-writers-fire-agents-as-new-reality-takes-hold-1203876. 
 10.  Nellie Andreeva, Writers Show Unity With Big Turnout At WGA Solidarity Mixer, 
DEADLINE (Apr. 18, 2019, 10:33 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/writers-unity-big-turn 
out-wga-solidarity-mixer-1202598843/; Chris Lee, How Hollywood Writers Are Finding Jobs 
After Firing Their Agents, VULTURE (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/2019/04 /how-
wga-writers-are-finding-jobs-after-firing-agents.html. 
 11.  WGAe-Writers Guild East AFL-CIO, Labor Organization Annual Report (Form 
LM-2), at Schedule 13 (U.S. Dep’t of Lab., July 1, 2019) (reporting total membership of 
5,116); WGAw-Writers Guild West Independent, Labor Organization Annual Report (Form 
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and producers on television series), series staff writers, and screenwriters 
responsible for almost every major motion picture and series. Each of the 
major studios, their affiliated television networks, and major video-on-
demand services are signatories to the WGA’s collective bargaining 
agreement.12 
On the other side of the dispute are the talent agents, represented by the 
Association of Talent Agents (ATA). The ATA today is a trade association 
representing talent agents and agencies in the entertainment industries. 
Formed in 1937 as the Artists’ Managers Guild, the ATA’s members 
represent almost all of the working talent in Hollywood today, including 
screenwriters, showrunners, staff writers, actors, directors, and producers. 
Generally, their job is to introduce talent (workers) to networks, studios, 
streamers, and financiers (hiring entities) in hopes of soliciting offers from 
those hiring entities. However, it is standard practice in the industry for talent 
agents to negotiate material terms for their non-union clients and “over-
scale” terms13 for their union clients. The ATA’s membership includes the 
major talent agencies: Creative Artists Agency (CAA), ICM Partners (ICM), 
United Talent Agency (UTA), William Morris Endeavor (WME), Agency 
for the Performing Arts (APA), The Gersh Agency, and Paradigm Talent 
Agency which collectively represent almost all of writers’ earnings potential 
in Hollywood.14 The ATA membership also includes over one hundred 
smaller so-called “boutique” agencies.15 
Guilds, writers and talent agents are formally bound together through a 
so-called “franchise” agreement. At its heart, a franchise system is a private 
licensing scheme in which union members “agree to use only agents who 
have been ‘franchised’ [i.e., licensed] by their respective guilds; in turn, as a 
condition of franchising, the guilds may require agents to agree to a code of 
 
LM-2), at Schedule 13 (U.S. Dep’t of Lab., June 27, 2019) (reporting total membership of 
24,440). 
 12.  The major studios today are: Columbia Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Universal 
Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures, and Warner Bros. Pictures. Their corporate sibling networks 
include the major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC and FOX), as well as many cable 
networks (e.g., The CW, USA Network, TBS, TNT, ESPN, MTV, Paramount Network, 
Comedy Central, etc.). The major video-on-demand services include Netflix, Amazon 
Studios, and Hulu, among others. 
 13.  “Over-scale” terms mean those contract terms more advantageous to the individual 
writer than those provided for in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by such talent’s 
respective union. 
 14.  Jordan Crucchiola, The Hollywood Fight That’s Tearing Apart Writers and Agents, 
Explained, VULTURE (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/article/wga-hollywood-
agents-packaging-explained.html (“CAA, WME, and UTA alone ‘account for almost 70% of 
WGA members’ earnings,’ according to the Guild”). 
 15.  Ass’n of Talent Agents, FAQ: What Is ATA?, ASS’N OF TALENT AGENTS, https:// 
www.agentassociation.com/index.php?src=gendocs&ref=FAQ&category=Main (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2020). 
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conduct and restrictions on terms included in agent-talent contracts.”16 These 
arrangements are common across all the major Hollywood guilds,17 and are 
permitted under federal law.18 
In the 1970s, the WGA “desire[d] that a Code of Fair Practice be 
promulgated . . . to minimize or eliminate any practices [then] mutually 
deemed undesirable.”19 The Guild set out to do just that. While federal law 
permitted the Guild to set any franchise terms it desired, it also understood 
the economic reality that the terms could not be so onerous as to discourage 
agents from representing Guild members. Thus, the WGA entered into 
negotiations with the Artists’ Managers Guild, which would represent the 
interests of the talent agents, to craft a franchise agreement acceptable to both 
sides. Out of these negotiations the WGA drafted and ratified its standard 
agency franchise agreement: the Artists’ Manager Basic Agreement 
(“AMBA”).20 Each individual agent or agency would be required to 
subscribe to its terms before becoming franchised.21 The AMBA would 
control the scope and mode of agency representation for Guild writers for 
the next forty-five years, until 2019. 
 
 16.  Marathon Entm’t., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974, 983 (2008). 
 17.  The Director’s Guild of America (DGA) uses the Agreement Between Association 
of Talent Agents and Directors Guild of America, Inc., and the Screen Actors Guild-American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA) uses the Basic Contract Between 
Screen Actors Guild and Association of Talent Agents and National Association of Talent 
Representatives. 
 18.  The franchise system is permitted under the National Labor Relations Act, which 
grants to unions “the right to self-organization . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.” See U.S.C. § 157. As a function of self-organizing, unions 
are generally permitted to create rules for their own members. In 1981, the Supreme Court 
held the Clayton Act exempts from Sherman Act anti-trust liability a similar franchise system 
employed by Actors’ Equity Association, specifically holding agents are a “labor group.” 
H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n., 451 U.S. 704, 714, 720 (1981). In dicta, the 
Supreme Court noted “[t]he peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where work 
is intermittent, where it is customary if not essential for union for union members to secure 
employment through agents, and where agents’ fees are calculated as a percentage of a 
member’s wage, makes it impossible for the union to defend even the integrity of the 
minimum wages it has negotiated without regulation of agency fees” and other agency 
conduct. Id. WGA rules permit the union to discipline its members for engaging the services 
of non-franchised agents. See Writers Guild of Am., const., art. X, sec. 1 (empowering guild 
to discipline members for breaching Working Rules); see Writers Guild of Am., Code of 
Working R., Working R. 1, Working R. 23 (discipline may include expulsion for breach of 
working rules, including the rule forbidding the engagement of non-franchised agents). 
 19.  Writers Guild of Am., Artists’ Manager Basic Agreement of 1976 at 1, Recital 3, 
https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/09/amba1976.pdf [hereinafter 
WGA AMBA]. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 1 (“Now, therefore, the following shall be the agreement between [ATA] on 
the one hand and WGA on the other, and shall also be an agreement with such [Talent Agents] 
as may subscribe hereto and by such subscription assume the obligations hereof”). 
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It was the AMBA that ignited the 2019 packaging wars in Hollywood. 
Pursuant to the terms of the AMBA, the Guild had the right to provide notice 
to the ATA of its intent to terminate the AMBA, to be effective twelve 
months later.22 On April 6, 2018, the WGA exercised its right and notified 
the ATA.23 This started the one-year clock. Once the AMBA expired, talent 
agents would no longer be permitted to represent Guild writers. To remain 
franchised, they would have to sign whatever new franchise agreement the 
WGA put in front of them, whatever the terms might be. That one-year clock 
was set to expire at midnight on April 6, 2019, but by agreement between 
the WGA and ATA was extended for a week to April 12, 2019, after which 
the new CCFA franchise agreement would become effective.24 
 
B. The Packaging Wars 
 
1. Packaging Historically 
 
To fully understand the tensions between agents and writers requires a 
robust appreciation of how “packaging” evolved by 2019.25 Packaging is 
implemented in almost every industry. Conceptually, it is simply a risk-
mitigation strategy. As the old saying goes, a great idea is only worth the 
paper it’s printed on. Turning a good idea into something marketable takes 
time, money and resources. So by bundling a great idea with talented 
personnel able to develop it, produce it, take it to market and sell it (i.e., by 
packaging it), the chances are higher that the investment of time, money and 
resources into the idea will be recouped and generate a profit. A higher 
chance of profitability improves the chance that investors will take a risk on 
any given project. The film industry is no different. Packaging has existed 
since the days of silent film. It is the way the business has always operated 
and, perhaps, will always operate. But the real question then, as it is today, 
is: whose job is it to put the package together? 
In Tinseltown’s earliest years, movie studios bore the burden of 
packaging their own productions. Studios hired producers whose job was to 
 
 22.  Id. at 1, § 1(a). 
 23.  Dave McNary, Writers Guild Seeks to Renegotiate Agreement With Agents, 
VARIETY (Apr. 6, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/writers-guild-renego 
tiate-agreement-agents-1202746532/. 
 24.  Nellie Andreeva, Mike Fleming Jr. & David Robb. WGA & ATA Reach Last-Minute 
Extension As Franchise Agreement Was Set To Expire, DEADLINE (Apr. 6, 2019, 10:00 PM), 
https://deadline.com/2019/04/wga-ata-last-minute-extension-franchise-agreement-was-set-
to-expire-1202589771/. 
 25.  See Brian T. Smith, Comment, Sending Agents To The Principal’s Office: How 
Talent Agency Packaging and Producing Breach the Fiduciary Duties Agents Owe Their 
Artist-Clients, 27 UCLA ENTM’T. L. REV. 173, 180-193 (2020) (more in-depth look at the 
history and evolution of agency packaging historically). 
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put together movies’ creative elements. This included developing stories, 
hiring writers, directors, actors, and scores of other artists and technicians 
whose services were required to make films. Studios negotiated with agents 
on an ad hoc basis. Each script, each writer, each director, each actor was a 
separate transaction that the studio would have to negotiate through its 
producer. The agent’s job was merely “to field offers” from the producer and 
to negotiate for their clients.”26 Typically, this earned the agent a 
commission, usually in the amount of ten percent of their client’s gross 
income from such deals.27 
But agents were not just gatekeepers for their clients. Agencies became 
known quantities whom studios could approach for the best or most popular 
talent. Just as agents swung the doors open one way for their clients, they 
swung the doors the other way for the studios. Agents became clearinghouses 
for top-flight talent studios could approach to stock their films with stars who 
would guarantee box office success. Ultimately, though, it remained the 
studios’ job to aggregate talent for each of its projects. The agent’s job was 
simply to represent individual clients in their dealings with the studios. 
Eventually, though, “the role of the agent added an entrepreneurial 
component, requiring creative instincts to combine certain literary material” 
from writers “with appropriate director and/or acting talent in a package 
presented to financing sources/studios.”28 
It is unclear whether the transition to agency packaging was by design 
on the part of the agents or the studios. But by the 1970s at the latest, studios 
and networks sought to off-load the burden of packaging their own films and 
episodic series. In an ever-growing trend, the studios shifted the burden of 
content development and packaging creative personnel to independent 
development companies, producers, casting directors and, of course, talent 
agents.29 For the studios, this meant lower risk. And the studios, motivated 
by those lower risks, increasingly were willing to provide guaranteed work 
for known and packaged creative talent. For the agents, this meant more 
 
 26.  Jessica Tuchinsky, The Talent Agent, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK, 213, 214 
(Jason E. Squire ed., Routledge 4th ed. 2017). 
 27.  Id. at 216. 
 28.  Id. at 214. 
 29.  See Gary Baum, New Hollywood Economy: Pay-for-Play Auditions for Actors Gain 
Dominance, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 30, 2016, 5:00 AM), (“Cost-conscious networks 
and studios offload a burden once held by productions to cast their own shows onto the labor 
market itself. Millions of dollars previously spent on casting have been cut from balance 
sheets. . . . The casting profession has undergone a transformation in the past three decades 
from a realm defined primarily by staff positions to independent contractor roles”); See 
Jonathan Handel, Agencies, Writers Guild on Collision Course Over Fees and More, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:47 AM) https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
news/agencies-writers-guild-collision-course-fees-more-1105208 (“The key issues for the 
guild: packaging, a half-century old system in which agencies assemble the creative elements 
of a television series”). 
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money. Taking ten percent from multiple clients on an individual project was 
far more lucrative than taking ten percent from only one or two clients on 
any given film. Less work for the studio. More money for the agent. 
Guaranteed work for the clients. Simple economics. Efficient capitalism at 
work. Everybody won. The practice was so common that while the WGA 
and ATA acknowledged a “difference of opinion,” the AMBA expressly 
permitted the practice of packaging.30 But at some point, packaging further 
evolved. 
Today, David Simon is best known as the creator of critically-
acclaimed television series like The Wire and Treme. But in the early 1990s, 
he was still a crime reporter for the Baltimore Sun newspaper and had just 
published his book, Homicide: A Year On The Killing Streets. An 
unvarnished look at life in the Baltimore Police Department’s homicide unit 
and Edgar Award-winner, Hollywood soon came calling. When mega-
producer/director Barry Levinson made an offer for the rights, Simon 
engaged the services of CAA agent Matt Snyder. On his website, Simon 
describes his experience with the first evolution in agency practices as they 
began to place more emphasis on closing deals than on the terms of the deals: 
Then the contract comes back from Baltimore Pictures [Levinson’s 
company] . . . . Fine for the option money, a little light on the contingent 
pilot, pick-up and episodic payments and, of course, farce on the definition 
of net profits. So I call Matt Snyder back and say so: This seems a little light 
and it’s a first offer. Let’s go back to Levinson with a counter. 
And Matt Snyder of CAA acts as if his client, me, has just thrown a 
dead, rancid dog on the table. This is my first book sale to Hollywood and 
Barry Levinson is an A-lister; I should be grateful for this offer and worried 
that if I nickel-and-dime, Levinson may develop something else.31 
After some cajoling by Simon, agent Snyder returned to Levinson and 
brought back the terms his client wanted. Simon reports: “Snyder, relentless 
carnivore that he is, returns to his client with pride and some pocket 
change.”32 But not every writer is so lucky. Even by today’s standards, 
Simon’s early 1990s experience is hardly unique. Writers in 2019 reported 
 
 30.  WGA AMBA, supra note 19, at § 6(c) (“WGA has asserted that the services of 
Writers in the fields of radio, television and motion pictures are connected with and affected 
by the packaging representation of Writers and others by [Talent Agents]. . . . The 
arrangements set forth in this agreement and Exhibit N, so far as they affect packaging 
representation, constitute a mutual voluntary accommodation by each party of the practical 
needs which each party considers its members may face with respect to the arrangements 
under which [Talent Agents] represent writers for services or sale of literary materials or for 
packaging”). 
 31.  David Simon, “But I’m not a lawyer. I’m an agent”, AUDACITY OF DESPAIR (Mar. 
18, 2019), https://davidsimon.com/but-im-not-a-lawyer-im-an-agent/ (article used with 
author’s permission). 
 32.  Id. 
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agents refusing to return phone calls to writers who would not agree to 
deals.33 Some writers even reported agents firing clients who refused to 
capitulate to a studio’s proposed terms when they were on the table.34 A 
former employee of one of the Big Four agencies reported that “agents would 
push writers into packages to maximize the agency’s revenue, regardless of 
whether it was in the clients’ best interests or even what [the writer] 
wanted.”35 
Then, these strained relationships evolved again. In the 1990s and early 
2000s, the independent film boom hit. “Indies” gave unknowns an 
opportunity to break in. They gave veterans “street cred.” And the financial 
potential for a Pulp Fiction or Blair Witch Project-level payday gave 
distributors a gambler’s high. The script became the hottest commodity in 
town, screenwriters became bona fide movie stars in their own right, and 
everybody from directors to actors became buyers. Everybody wanted the 
next Sundance sleeper hit. Up-and-coming distributors like Miramax, New 
Line and October Films wanted the next Best Picture Oscar winner. The 
early aughts also saw the rise of “Peak TV,” turning television into gold, and 
showrunners like Shonda Rhimes and Ryan Murphy into empires unto 
themselves. The line between seller and buyer was no longer divided by the 
line between the artist and the studio. 
Suddenly, it was no longer unusual for a writer and buyer to be 
represented by the same talent agent. Nor was it unusual for the agent to 
represent both the seller and the buyer in the same transaction. Simon more 
fully illustrates the conflict: 
And now, here’s where the real fun starts: 
We push forward a decade to 2002 when I have sold my own dramatic 
television series to HBO. The Wire pilot turned out well enough that the 
project is set to get a first-season order from HBO and my television agent, 
Jeff Jacobs of CAA, suggests to me that this thing might really have legs. 
“We want to package you,” he offers. 
“Package me?” 
“Yeah, we’ll take a package on this project and you get your ten-percent 
commission back. Like with Homicide? 
Hanh? “Jake, what the f*** are you talking about.” 
“Homicide was packaged and we’ll do the same thing with The Wire.” 
“Jake, slow down, what the hell does ‘packaged’ mean?” 
 
 33.  Writers Guild of Am. W., WGA-Agency Campaign: Writers Share Their 




t%20interest (last visited May 5, 2019) [hereinafter WGA-Agency Campaign]. 
 34.  Id. at 40. 
 35.  Id. at 7. 
 
 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 43:1 10 
And for the first time, Jacobs explains it to me. 
. . . 
There was a quiet on the phone. Until I asked a second question: “What 
other talent did you package with me?” 
“Barry Levinson.” 
At which point, there was no more quiet. 
“Jake, do you mean to say that you represented me, a pissant police 
reporter from Baltimore in a head-on negotiation with one of Hollywood’s 
A-list directors and you also represented the director? You represented both 
sides in the sale of my book and when the low-ball offer came to me, Matt 
f***ing Snyder acted like it was the only offer I might ever get? Is that what 
you motherf***ers did?” 
. . . 
Then I asked another question: “Jake, do you have any written consent 
from me on file in which I authorize you to rep both sides of the sale of my 
book? I will answer that for you: You do not. I never authorized this. Not to 
CAA. Not to my book agent. I never gave informed consent. I couldn’t. 
Because I was never informed.36 
Unfortunately for the young Simon, he had retained the services of an 
agency that insisted on double-dealing from both sides of the transaction. 
And this simultaneous representation was given the moniker “packaging.” 
Even today, such simultaneous representation continues to occur. 
 
2. The Packaging Wars of 2018 - 2019 
 
It does not appear that Hollywood writers take issue with the concept 
of pure packaging itself. Its traditional implementation is a sound business 
decision for writers: a means of increasing the prospect of a job offer or a 
script sale. However, writers have grave concerns about the conflicts that 
have arisen of late with the final evolutions of so-called “packaging.” These 
include double-dealing, self-dealing, and the systemic effects of those 
conflicts. In 2018, screenwriters and television writers identified three major 
issues that led to their vote to terminate the AMBA in favor of a new 
franchise agreement with a stronger code of conduct for writers’ 
representatives. 
 
a. Double Dealing: Packaging Fees 
 
At some point in time, straight packaging reached its zenith. Agencies 
began offering formal “package” arrangements to studios and networks in 
which they would pay agencies directly in exchange for packaging services. 
 
 36.  Simon, supra note 31. 
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In simple terms, agencies began taking fees from the very companies they 
were supposed to be negotiating against on behalf of their clients. Studios 
and networks today offer packages to agencies in two different forms. The 
first is a partial package, in which multiple agencies split a single packaging 
fee and each is responsible for only certain parts of the total creative bundle. 
And then there is the full package, more lucrative and coveted by agencies. 
A full package occurs when an agency is responsible for bundling all of the 
creative elements on a single production and takes the entire fee. In 2016, 
87% of all episodic series were subject to agency packaging arrangements, 
with CAA and WME alone taking fees from 79% of all packaged series.37 
Today, the major agencies have entire departments devoted to packaging.38 
Recognizing that representing both buyers and sellers creates conflicts, 
agencies have attempted to assuage their writer clients by agreeing to waive 
their rights to their commissions. However, writers took two issues with this. 
First and foremost, it led to agents who prejudiced their writer clients in order 
to close deals with their studio and network clients. The relationship between 
the studios/networks and the agents has become so cozy that agents are even 
taking moral ownership over the shows. One writer relays a story from one 
of the Big Four agencies: 
As part of their training, the junior agents were given an in-house course 
on contract negotiation . . . . One of the junior agents was assigned to 
negotiate a staff writer’s deal on a packaged show. When this junior agent 
started to present his proposed terms for the deal, one of the senior agents 
cut in and said: ‘Let me just stop you right there. This is a staff writer on one 
of our shows. You don’t negotiate these. You take what [the networks] offer, 
say thank you, and move on.39 
Other writers report agents who tout their ability to get their writer 
clients to take lower fees. One showrunner (a writer in a position to hire other 
writers on a television show) tells the story of his own agent approaching 
him to “say, basically, ‘Since we’re packaging this, we can help you out with 
some of our clients. This writer has a $20,000 quote, but I think I could get 
them for $14,000.’”40 One WGA showrunner even reports an agent who 
“cit[ed] the fact that he had gotten his client . . . to accept a fee substantially 
below his quote. The agent was bragging about harming their own client.”41 
The other issue is that packaging fees often vastly outpace the 
commissions to which agencies would otherwise be entitled. One writer 
 
 37.  David Robb, WGA Data: 87% Of All Scripted TV Shows Are Packaged, DEADLINE 
(Mar. 15, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://deadline.com/2018/03/tv-series-packaging-agency-domi 
nation-wme-caa-writers-guild-data-1202338755/. 
 38.  WGA-Agency Campaign, supra note 33, at 7 (“Before I became a working writer, I 
worked in the packaging department of a major agency”). 
 39.  Id. at 12. 
 40.  Id. at 15. 
 41.  Id. at 13. 
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describes his experience on a show that he created, when his agency 
“negotiated for itself a packaging fee of over $70,000 an episode plus 10% 
of the backend on the series – the single biggest backend stake,” lamenting 
that “[his] agency will make more than [him] on this project.”42 For the 
writers, the question is: if the studios/networks are willing to pay those kinds 
of fees to the agency, then why would they not be willing to pay those kinds 
of fees to the writers and other artists? Further exacerbating this problem is 
that agency fees are tied to and come directly out of the budgets of film and 
television shows being packaged.43 Packaging fees are not merely a 
transactional cost a studio or network must bear as overhead, but a 
production expense tied to a particular series or film. Along with costs to pay 
stunt people and build props, packaging fees are built into the budgets of the 
shows and movies themselves. As with the budget process in any other 
industry, more money allocated to the packaging line item means less money 
allocated to pay for things that make a movie or show better like actors, 
directors, editors, props, location rentals, visual effects, special effects, or 
any number of other production-related expenses. As one showrunner 
lamented, “[p]aradoxically, [the agents’] own argument that they champion 
independent film collapses on itself because packaging fees take money out 
of the budget. That money could go to shooting days or special effects.”44 
 
b. Self-Dealing: Agency-Owned Productions 
 
The other major conflict in the packaging wars evolved only recently. 
In 2016, the major talent agencies began to diversify their portfolios by 
taking direct pecuniary interests in the projects their clients work on, and 
equity interests in the companies that produce those projects. For example, 
in December 2016, CAA hired former ABC president Paul Lee to organize 
and create an agency-owned television studio.45 In 2017, William Morris 
Endeavor touted its packaging when it announced, with IMG, the formation 
of Endeavor Content, which takes ownership interests in the projects it 
packages.46 And in 2018, UTA announced it would use $200 million to fund 
a joint television production venture with Valence Media and Media Rights 
 
 42.  Id. at 2. 
 43.  Id. at 10 (“The package fee in the budget is among the highest in the industry”). 
 44.  Id. at 19. 
 45.  Elizabeth Wagmeister & Daniel Holloway, Former ABC Chief Paul Lee Eyes TV 
Production Company Set Up at CAA, VARIETY (Dec. 8, 2016, 4:06 PM), https://variety.com/ 
2016/tv/news/paul-lee-caa-production-company-1201937600/. 
 46.  Jeremy Kay, WME, IMG film and TV sales groups form Endeavor Content, SCREEN 
DAILY (Oct. 16, 2017) https://www.screendaily.com/news/wme-img-film-and-tv-sales-grou 
ps-form-endeavor-content-/5123308.article; see also Sun & Handel, supra, note 1. 
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Capital.47 In hiring the writers and other artists, the agencies are not simply 
representing both sides of the transactions anymore. Instead, the agencies are 
one side of the transaction and are expected to negotiate against themselves 
in representation of their writer clients. This constitutes not simply double-
dealing, but self-dealing, as the agents become employers of their own 
clients. 
 
c. Labor Market Constriction and Creative Limitations 
 
Along with conflicts-of-interest arising from packaging and agency-
owned productions, writers are also concerned with the indirect 
consequences of those conflicts. In addition to showrunners’ complaints that 
packaging fees are a cancer on a show’s budget, the writers and other talent 
complain about the constraining impact packaging has on the Hollywood 
labor market. On a microlevel, the market for writers artificially and 
arbitrarily constricts when agents cause unnecessary delays or outright refuse 
to close deals for their writer clients. The WGA reports several instances in 
which agents have refused to work for writers because the agencies have 
greater interests in packaging: 
I like working on a TV writing staff, but agents are not interested in 
representing writers who want to do that. They’re only interested in writers 
who develop new projects because that’s how they get a package fee. I went 
looking for an agent and met with some low level agents at one of the big 
agencies. They seemed very excited until I said I wanted to work as a staff 
[writer] on a [pre-existing] show rather than develop [new projects]. They 
said, ‘If you’re not into developing, then we’re not interested. It’s not worth 
it to us.’”48 
A network challenged the formula for a package fee that an agency was 
insisting upon. . . . During a yearlong stalemate the agency withheld series 
pitches to that network from all their clients. No agency client pitched a 
series to that network that year. Not because the network said they wouldn’t 
take the pitches; not because the network wasn’t offering enough 
compensation to the writers. Solely because the agency put its compensation 
ahead of its clients’ job opportunities, no writers from that agency sold a 
series to that network. Series that would have sold didn’t.49 
I was on my way to a meeting with a network executive to pitch a show 
– a ‘mere formality,’ the exec said, as he was a friend who had told me over 
dinner a few weeks earlier to ‘just come in and tell it to my people and we’ll 
 
 47.  Rebecca Sun, UTA, MRC and Valence Media Form Joint Television Venture, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 10, 2018, 12:30 PM) https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
news/uta-mrc-valence-media-form-joint-television-venture-1151280. 
 48.  WGA-Agency Campaign, supra note 33, at 6. 
 49.  Id. at 9. 
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have you writing in a week.’ During my drive, I get a call from my agent 
who says, ‘Turn around. I canceled the meeting. . . . They won’t make a 
packaging deal with us.50 
Agents make their own packaging deals the first order of business with 
studios and networks. Writers complain that if an agent’s overzealous 
negotiation of the packaging contract does not scuttle a negotiation entirely, 
it almost always results in delays negotiating and closing the writers’ 
contracts.51 While writers wait for these deals to close, they are effectively 
shut out of other jobs due to potential unavailability. And there are larger 
systemic issues that arise from modern-day packaging. 
The larger problem facing writers is that they have access only to the 
studios, networks or productions represented by their agencies. Showrunners 
are forced to hire staff writers represented only by their own agencies. 
Agents shut out staff writers from every studio with which the agencies do 
not have packaging agreements in place. Additionally, packaging affects 
showrunners, staff writers and film writers because packages are limited not 
just to writers, but every creative element. Agents refuse to help series writers 
and film writers meet with actors, directors, and producers unless the same 
agency represents those other creative talents. At least one showrunner 
reported that a desired actor’s agent refused to even consider an offer on his 
show. Said the actor’s agent: “Not gonna lie to you, we’re doing everything 
we can to kill his [i.e., the actor’s] interest in the project . . . No reason we 
should split packaging fees if we don’t have to.”52 Another showrunner 
explains that “[p]ackaging limits us creatively. In setting up a show, I have 
access to 25% of the talent in town” – the talent represented only by his own 
agency.53 In other words, a staff writer can only get a job on a show if the 
same agency represents the showrunner. The same is true for actors and 
directors. This effectively constrains the labor market for artists’ services. 
 
C. What does any of this have to do with attorneys? 
 
At the eleventh hour of the negotiations between the Association and 
the Guild in 2019, ATA executive director Karen Stuart drew attorneys 
directly into the growing dispute. Given the WGA’s CCFA franchise 
agreement, which takes a hard line position on the conflicts-of-interest 
 
 50.  Id. at 27. 
 51.  Id. at 4 (“This deal took a very long time to close. After it finally did, I talked to the 
exec at the studio about the delay, and she told me that the packaging fee had held things up. 
My agency wouldn’t close the deal without the fee”); also id. at 32 (“My manager asked the 
actor’s agent what was going on. The agent said, ‘Not gonna lie to you, we’re doing 
everything we can to kill his interest in the project. . . . No reason we should split packaging 
fees if we don’t have to’”). 
 52.  Id. at 32. 
 53.  Id. at 18. 
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arising from packaging and agency-owned productions, the WGA 
anticipated the possibility that negotiations with the ATA would break down 
before expiration of the AMBA. Not wanting its membership to lose all 
forms of representation at the height of staffing season, the WGA devised a 
plan in the event the ATA did not sign off on the CCFA. On March 20, 2019, 
the WGA issued the following so-called “delegation letter:”54 
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., together with Writers Guild of 
America, East, Inc. (collectively, “Guild” or “WGA”), is the exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining of all writers 
(“Writers”) employed under the WGA Theatrical and Television Basic 
Agreement (“MBA”). As such, under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the Guild is vested with the exclusive right to bargain 
over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment on behalf of 
such Writers. The Guild, in its sole discretion, may delegate its exclusive 
bargaining authority on terms that it establishes. 
The Guild, as the exclusive bargaining representative,55 hereby 
authorizes you to procure employment and negotiate overscale terms and 
conditions of employment for individual Writers in connection with MBA-
covered employment and MBA-covered options and purchases of literary 
material, consistent with Article 9 of the MBA. Nothing herein shall be 
construed to permit you to negotiate terms and conditions of employment 
inferior to or in conflict with the terms of the MBA. 
The WGA followed this with a letter to its members in which it 
deputized attorneys: “other representatives can support [Guild] members 
who could soon be without representation . . . . Many Guild members have a 
manager or attorney who can help fill some of the gap.”56 
The ATA ignored the WGA’s letter for nearly a month. Negotiations 
continued to stall. Finally, on April 12 – the final deadline – the ATA fired 
back. The ATA’s attorneys issued a public letter “that the WGA’s purported 
delegation violates both California’s Talent Agencies Act (“TAA”) and New 
York’s General Business Law,” and demanded the WGA retract the 
delegated authorization.57 The ATA then issued a stern threat to all 
 
 54.  Dave McNary, WGA Authorizing Managers, Lawyers to Make Deals if Agents Are 
Fired, VARIETY (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:17 PM), https://variety.com/2019/film/news/wga-mana 
gers-lawyers-deals-agents-fired-1203168913/. 
 55.  The Guild asserts in this letter that it is the exclusive bargaining representative for 
all members of the union in all cases. However, other commentators find the WGA’s claim 
dubious. See Richard Kopenhefer, Deputy Lawyer; WGA Tries Preemption Route in ATA 
Dispute, SHEPPARD MULLIN LAB. & EMP. LAW BLOG (Apr. 4, 2019), (last visited Apr. 10, 
2019) https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2019/04/articles/collective-bargaining/ 
wga-preemption-route-ata-dispute/. 
 56.  McNary, supra note 54. 
 57.  Letter from Marvin S. Putnam, Attorney, Latham & Watkins LLP, to WGA West 
Board of Directors & WGA East Council, Re: WGA Purported Delegation of Authority, 
AGENTS ASS’N (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.agentassociation.com/clientuploads/Letter_ 
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entertainment lawyers in California: “The [ATA] considers any and all 
unlawful procurement entered into at the behest of the WGA to be unfair and 
unlawful competition that will harm the ATA and its member agencies. . . . 
ATA will take appropriate action as needed, against any person engaged in 
unfair competition, to protect the lawful interests of its members.”58 
Calling the WGA’s position both “shocking and disturbing,” Stuart 
published a follow-up letter to her membership in which she doubled down 
on the ATA’s position: “I want to reiterate that we are confident in our 
position – the law is crystal clear. . . . [T]here are multiple decisions from 
the California Labor Commission holding that no one other than a licensed 
talent agent – not a manager, not an attorney – can procure employment on 
behalf of an artist. It is important to note that ‘procure’ in this situation 
includes all negotiations on behalf of an artist.”59 She then magnified the 
ATA’s earlier threat: “We are evaluating all legal options to address this 
unlawful conduct. We request that, to the extent you are aware of managers 
and attorneys who are embracing the WGA’s request to procure and 
negotiate employment in violation of the law, you track this information and 
the names of those who are participating in unfair competition, and provide 
that information to ATA’s attorneys.”60 The ATA thereby threatened to 
install an observe-and-report regime unseen since the days of the blacklist. 
Given the threats of legal action, lack of guidance from the state bar, 
and general confusion, many Hollywood attorneys abandoned their writer 
clients. One anonymous “heavyweight” entertainment attorney said that 
“[t]he WGA has no right to anoint anyone as a de facto agent to do anything 
for any of its members that an agent would do. . . . If they want [to] take their 
members down the garden path, I suggest they re-read relevant New York 
and California law.”61 Another anonymous but “prominent” Hollywood 
attorney reported “[t]he word that is going out all over town to entertainment 
lawyers is ‘pencils down.’”62 A third anonymous “influential” attorney said 
 
to_members_4-18-19.pdf [hereinafter Putnam Letter]; David Robb, Writers & Agents Set One 
Last Round Of Talks Before Tonight’s Deadline; WGA Responds To ATA Demand That Guild 
Not Deputize Managers & Lawyers To Replace Agents – Update, DEADLINE (Apr. 12, 2019, 
12:48 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/ata-demands-wga-cease-plan-to-deputize-manag 
ers-and-lawyers-to-replace-agents-1202594854/. 
 58.  Putnam Letter, supra note 57. 
 59.  Letter from Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent Agents, to 
Members, Association of Talent Agents, Re: WGA Attempted “Delegation” of Authority to 
Managers and Lawyers, AGENTS ASS’N (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.agentassociation.com/ 
clientuploads/Letter_to_members_4-18-19.pdf [hereinafter Stuart Letter]. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Dominic Patten & Nellie Andreeva, WGA & Agencies Battle Opens New Front As 
Lawyers Take “Pencil’s Down” Approach On New Deals For Scribes, DEADLINE (Apr. 15, 
2019, 5:50 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/wga-deputization-scheme-hollywood-lawye 
rs-managers-agents-mass-firing-code-of-conduct-1202596416. 
 62.  Id. 
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“[f]orget about it, the whole situation is too toxic,” and dismissed the WGA’s 
advice as “the misplaced thinking of amateurs who are hurting their members 
with disinformation.”63 These attorneys seemed hesitant, with fears raised 
that representing writer clients without an agent could result in complaints 
to the State Bar, investigations and even disbarment.64 However, a 
significant number of attorneys rejected the “pencils down” movement 
advocated by these few attorneys on the grounds that the ATA’s position was 
grounded on flawed Labor Commission decisions.65 
Unwittingly, the ATA made attorneys stakeholders in this dispute by 
raising the question in an adversarial tone: are licensed attorneys entitled to 
or prohibited from representing their writer clients in negotiations with 
studios, networks, and other buyers? As set forth in this article, the Talent 
Agencies Act does not prohibit attorneys from doing so. Furthermore, public 
policy, the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys 
authorize them to represent Hollywood writers and other artists without a 
talent agency license or the cooperation of a licensed talent agency. 
 
III. The Talent Agencies Act Does Not Prohibit Attorneys 
from Negotiating Artists’ Contracts 
 
A. The Talent Agencies Act Generally 
 
The Talent Agencies Act (herein, the “TAA” or the “Act”) is a statutory 
scheme enacted in 1978 to regulate and license talent agents in California for 
the protection of writers and other entertainers against unscrupulous talent 
marketers.66 It compels all persons or businesses that “procure” employment 
and engagements for artists to obtain a license from the California Labor 
Commission,67 and sets forth specific licensing requirements.68 The Act also 
regulates minor formalities in the relationship between talent agents and their 
clients, such as specific forms that agency contracts must take.69 The TAA 
grants to the Labor Commission original jurisdiction over disputes between 
artists and their representatives arising from violations of the Act, and de 
novo review in the California district courts.70 Together, the TAA and the 
General Rules and Regulations for Artists’ Managers set forth in the 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Nellie Andreeva, Lawyers Make Case For Legality Of Negotiating Agent-Less 
Writer Deals, DEADLINE (Apr. 19, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/writers-
guild-agencies-lawyers-deals-talent-agencies-act-state-bar-act-precedent-1202598143/. 
 66.  Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700 et seq. (Deering 2020). 
 67.  Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.5. 
 68.  Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700.6-1700.22. 
 69.  Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700.23-1700.41. 
 70.  Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.44. 
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California Code of Regulations71 form the code for licensing and regulating 
talent agents within the state. 
 
B. The California Labor Commission applied unlawful principles of 
statutory construction to render its decision in Solis v. Blancarte, the 
case on which the ATA relies 
 
Throughout this dispute, the ATA has placed great reliance on a single 
administrative decision: the California Labor Commission’s 2013 decision 
in the matter of Solis v. Blancarte.72 Mario Solis was a news anchor in Los 
Angeles. James Blancarte was his attorney, licensed to practice law in 
California. But Blancarte was not licensed as a talent agent. In 2002, a local 
news station approached Solis and expressed an interest in hiring him. Solis 
asked his long-time attorney, Blancarte, to handle negotiation of his 
employment agreement. Blancarte did. But in 2011, Solis sued Blancarte for 
alleged violations of the TAA to recover contingent fees paid to the attorney 
pursuant to their legal services agreement. In proceedings before the Labor 
Commission, Solis complained that Blancarte violated the TAA by 
negotiating the contract without first being licensed as a talent agent.73 
Blancarte asserted the defense that he was a duly-licensed attorney 
merely engaged in the practice of law when he negotiated Solis’ contract 
with the news station. Thus, he argued, his activities should have been 
exempt from regulation under the Talent Agencies Act.74 The Labor 
Commission disagreed, stating: 
 
[I]t is of no moment that some of the skills [Blancarte] may have 
brought to the negotiations on behalf of petitioner are the result of 
skills for which he has been licensed as an attorney. As Labor Code 
section 1700.44 makes unequivocally clear, when someone who is 
not licensed under the TAA wishes to bring such skills to bear on 
the negotiation of an artist’s contract, he must do so “in conjunction 
with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency.”75 
 
Blancarte never appealed the Solis decision. Consequently, since 2013, 
entertainment attorneys in California have worked in legal gray areas while 
negotiating agreements for Hollywood clients unless such attorneys are 
 
 71.  Gen. R. and Regs. for Artists’ Managers, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, §§ 12000-12033 
(2020). 
 72.  Solis v. Blancarte, TAC-27089 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n. Sept. 30, 2013), https://www. 
dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/TAC-27089%20M%20Solis%20v%20Blancarte%20093013.pdf. 
 73.  Id. at 1-5. 
 74.  Id. at 8. 
 75.  Id. at 8-9. 
 
2021 LITIGATORS AND DEALMAKERS  19 
dually-licensed as attorneys and as talent agents.76 But their uncertainty is 
not supported when one considers the Labor Commission’s faulty reasoning 
in Solis. 
Generally, administrative agencies like the Labor Commission are 
authorized to interpret the statutes they are charged with enforcing.77 
However, this is not plenary authority. While an agency’s interpretation is 
given “great weight,”78 it must be based on principles of statutory 
construction and “must be given a reasonable and common sense 
construction in accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the 
lawmakers.”79 The Labor Commission was required to utilize canons of 
statutory construction in Solis, including a review of legislative history, to 
interpret the Talent Agencies Act. However, the Labor Commission 
abrogated its duty by relying on its own equally faulty 2005 decision in 
Danielewski v. Agon Investment Company.80 The Danielewski case, 
however, was wholly inapplicable because the respondent was a talent 
manager, not an attorney. Additionally, the Labor Commission relied on a 
mere dictionary definition of “procure” for its holding, despite ambiguity 
within the definition itself. But closer review of Danielewski reveals a 
decrepit precedential foundation; Danielewski relied on yet another faulty 
Labor Commission case: the 1982 matter of Pryor v. Franklin.81 
So how did the Labor Commission in 1982 determine that the California 
legislature intended negotiation of an artist’s contract to constitute per se 
procurement under the Talent Agencies Act? The fact is that the Labor 
Commission fabricated the statutory construction in whole cloth, with no 
reliance on legislative or judicial authority: 
 
Respondent even admitted in his Response to the Petition and 
in his sworn deposition testimony that he had negotiated the 
employment agreements and engagements for Petitioners during the 
period 1975 through September 1980. Furthermore, Respondent’s 
counsel conceded at the hearing that Respondent had been 
Petitioners’ “sole and exclusive negotiator”. 
 
 76.  Id. at 6-7. 
 77.  Buchwald v. Super. Ct., 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 355 (1967); see also PacifiCare Life 
& Health Ins. Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.App.5th 391, 401 (2018) (“an agency’s authority to enforce 
or administer a statute includes the power to adopt a regulation ‘to implement, interpret, or 
make specific the law enforced or administered by it”). 
 78.  W. States Petrol. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Equalization, 57 Cal. 4th 401, 437 (2013) 
(Kennard, J., concurring). 
 79.  Buchwald, 254 Cal.App.2d at 354. 
 80.  Annie Danielewski v. Agon Investment & Robert Edsel, TAC 41-03, at 15-16 (Cal. 
Lab. Comm’n. Oct. 28, 2005), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/2003-41%20Annie% 
20Danielewski%20v%20Agon%20investment%20&%20Robert%20Edsel.pdf. 
 81.  Id. at 15-16. 
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The evidence of Respondent’s active and continuous participation in 
the process of negotiating the terms of Pryor’s employment over the five year 
period would, standing alone, constitute sufficient evidence of unlawful 
procurement and attempted procurement to warrant and justify a finding that 
Respondent had engaged in the occupation of an artist’s manager and talent 
agent without a license and in so doing had flagrantly violated the Act. 
We reject Respondent’s contention that to prove unlawful procurement 
or attempted procurement one must offer evidence of solicitation or an 
initiated contact. This argument runs afoul of well established principles 
which we choose to follow, namely, that the furthering of an offer constitutes 
a significant aspect of procurement prohibited by law since procurement 
includes the entire process of reaching an agreement on negotiated terms 
where the intended purpose is to market an artist’s talent. These principles 
are totally in accordance with the purposes of the Act.82 
Notice the lack of internal citations. 
So, the question naturally arises: from what authority do these “well 
established principles” arise that the Labor Commission supposedly 
followed? The answer: none. The Labor Commission cited to no authority 
articulating these “well established principles.” The Labor Commission 
engaged in zero study or analysis of committee reports or legislative 
statements. The Labor Commission engaged in zero analysis of the 
legislative history of the statute. And yet these unidentified principles 
became the basis for the 1982 Pryor decision, which in turn became the basis 
for the 2005 Danielewski decision, which in turn became the basis for the 
2013 Solis decision on which the ATA relied. If Pryor is the poisonous tree, 
then Solis is its fruit. 
The California Labor Commission relied on precedent that arbitrarily 
and ambiguously cited authorities it could not identify. Furthermore, the 
Labor Commission failed to apply canons of statutory construction. And in 
clear violation of California state law, the Labor Commission failed to render 
“a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance with” the 
legislative intent behind the Talent Agencies Act.83 Courts should disregard 
and give no deference to Solis.84 
 
C. The plain language of the Talent Agencies Act neither prohibits nor 
authorizes licensed attorneys to engage in activities constituting the 
“practice of law” in California 
 
 82.  Pryor v. Franklin, TAC 17 MP 114, at 14-15 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n, Aug. 12, 1982), 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/17%20MP-114.pdf. 
 83.  Buchwald, 254 Cal.App.2d at 354. 
 84.  W. States Petrol.,57 Cal.4th at 437 (“courts give the agency’s interpretation of 
statutory language ‘great weight’ but do not otherwise defer”) (Kennard, J., concurring). 
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The heart of the TAA lies in Section 1700.4 of the Labor Code. This 
section defines a “talent agent” as “a person or corporation who engages in 
the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure 
employment or engagements for an artist or artists.”85 It does not expressly 
include or exclude from the definition any professionals otherwise licensed 
in the state such as attorneys, sports agents, insurance agents, real estate 
agents, stock brokers, etc. Whether a person is a talent agent is not dependent 
on his or her title, but whether their activities fall under the “procurement” 
rubric set forth in the statute itself. However, the statute is painfully silent on 
whether attorneys are talent agents. The Talent Agencies Act also fails to 
define in its plain language just what constitutes “procuring, offering, 
promising, or attempting to procure” employment or engagements. Simply, 
the black-letter of the statute is silent as to whether attorneys’ activities 
negotiating employment and engagement contracts for their clients in the 
entertainment industries constitutes “procurement” that is subject to the 
Talent Agencies Act.86 
Fortunately, the legislature provides a roadmap for how to interpret this 
silence. That roadmap is a similar statute which regulates agents in a similar 
industry: California’s Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act.87 Prior to enactment 
of the Miller-Ayala Act, the athlete agent law in California’s Business and 
Professions Code did not address whether attorneys engaged in contract 
negotiations on behalf of athletes were subject to the licensing and regulatory 
requirements of the athlete agent law. “Rather, agent-attorneys were 
regulated [solely] by rules of ethics set forth by the California State Bar 
Association.”88 But in 1996, the state legislature decided to end its silence on 
the matter. The Miller-Ayala Act expressly and unambiguously amended the 
Business and Professions Code to subject attorneys to the licensing and 
regulatory requirements of the athlete agent laws. This change required 
attorneys to become dually licensed to negotiate on behalf of their athlete 
clients. 
 
 85.  Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4. 
 86.  Gary E. Devlin, Comment, The Talent Agencies Act: Reconciling the Controversies 
Surrounding Lawyers, Managers, and Agents Participating in California’s Entertainment 
Industry, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 381, 383 (2001) (“Notably, the [Talent Agencies] Act does not 
expressly mention the applicability of the Act toward lawyers”). 
 87.  1996 Cal. Stats 4568, Ch. 857, § 2 (Cal. 1996), codified Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 
18895.2 et seq. (Deering 2020). 
 88.  Robert P. Baker, The Unintended Consequence of the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents 
Act: Depriving Student Athletes of Effective Legal Representation, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
267, 270 (2005) (“One of the major changes to the new law was to subject attorneys to 
regulation”); James Malone & Daren Lipinsky, Comment, The Game Behind The Games: 
Unscrupulous Agents in College Athletics & California’s Miller-Ayala Act, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L.J. 413, 415 (1997) (citing Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1511, 1519 and 1547 (West 1989)). 
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Using remarkably similar language to the Talent Agencies Act, the 
Miller-Ayala Act defines an “athlete agent” not by a person’s title but by the 
activities in which he or she is engaged. Section 18895.2(b)(1) of the 
Business and Professions Code defines an athlete agent as “any person who, 
directly or indirectly, . . . procures, offers, promises, attempts or negotiates 
to obtain employment for any person with a professional sports team.”89 This 
language tracks with Section 1700.4(a) of the Labor Code which defines a 
talent agent as “a person . . . who engages in the occupation of procuring, 
promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagement for an 
artist.”90 Further distinguishing the black letter law of the Talent Agencies 
Act from the Miller-Ayala Act is the express inclusion of attorneys engaged 
in negotiation of employment agreements on behalf of their athlete clients in 
the definition of “athlete agents” under Miller-Ayala. Section 
18875.2(b)(2)(A) of the Miller-Ayala Act expressly defines the term “athlete 
agent” to include any “person licensed as an attorney . . . to the extent that 
the [attorney] also . . . for compensation procures, offers, promises, attempts, 
or negotiates to obtain employment for any person with a professional sports 
team.”91 The Miller-Ayala Act is express and unequivocal: licensed 
attorneys must be secondarily-licensed as athlete agents to negotiate or 
procure employment for athletes in California. Conversely, the plain, facial 
language of the Talent Agencies Act remains silent on the issue. 
Contrast the loud legislative expression and lack of ambiguity in the 
Miller-Ayala Act with the deafening legislative silence in the Talent 
Agencies Act. The Miller-Ayala Act presents a clear means of interpreting 
this legislative silence. Prior to, and but for, the California legislature’s clear 
intent to speak through the Miller-Ayala Act, California permitted attorneys 
to do anything and everything that athlete agents were permitted to do. The 
Miller-Ayala Act clearly and expressly ended that silence. And just as the 
legislative silence prior to the Miller-Ayala Act was held to empower 
attorneys, so must the same silence in the Talent Agencies Act today be 
interpreted. A statute may expressly and unambiguously prohibit attorneys 
from engaging in conduct that otherwise would constitute the practice of law. 
But if it does not, then such silence must be interpreted to permit them to do 
so even though such activities also constitute unlicensed procurement. 
A second black-letter distinction exists. The plain language of the 
Miller-Ayala Act clearly treats “procurement” activities as separate and 
distinct from “negotiation” activities. As Section 18895.2(b)(2)(A) states, an 
athlete-agent is one who “procures . . . or negotiates” employment or 
engagements on behalf of professional athletes. The key language in the 
statute is “or negotiates.” This language clearly implies an athlete-agent may 
 
 89.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895.2(b)(1). 
 90.  Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4(a). 
 91.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895.2(b)(2)(A). 
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engage in procurement or negotiation without necessarily engaging in the 
other. Therefore, negotiation is not per se procurement. Compare this to the 
Talent Agencies Act, which merely brings under its regulation only 
procurement activities. Whereas the California legislature clearly decided in 
an analogous regulatory scheme that procurement and negotiation are not the 
same thing, the Labor Commission apparently thought itself the better arbiter 
of the matter in Solis when it decided that negotiation necessarily constitutes 
per se procurement. The plain language of the Talent Agencies Act lacks two 
important elements found in the Miller-Ayala Act: an express inclusion of 
attorneys in the definition of “talent agencies,” and a solid line distinguishing 
procurement from negotiation. Therefore, what can be surmised from the 
plain language of the TAA is (i) that the state legislature never intended 
attorneys to be included in the definition of talent agents when the practice 
of law also constitutes procurement; and (ii) the negotiation of contracts does 
not constitute procurement of employment, and so an attorney’s negotiation 
of a writer’s contract does not constitute procurement; and for that reason 
cannot violate the Talent Agencies Act. 
In coming to this better-reasoned conclusion, it is as important to 
consider both the plain language of the statutes and the legislative processes 
during the 1996-1997 session of the state legislature that led to passage of 
the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act.92 Not only does the Miller-Ayala Act 
expressly include attorneys, but it also expressly excludes talent agents “as 
defined in subdivision (a) of Section 1700.4” of the Talent Agencies Act.93 
In other words, the state legislature was unambiguously considering the role 
and relationship of not two types of representatives, but three types of 
representatives: attorneys, sports agents, and talent agents. In addition to 
enacting the Miller-Ayala Act, the legislature in the same session also 
expressly amended the State Bar Act specifically to conform to the Miller-
Ayala Act.94 As codified today, the State Bar Act states explicitly that “[i]t 
shall constitute cause for the imposition of discipline of an attorney . . . for 
an attorney to violate any provision of the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents 
Act.”95 Nothing in the legislative record suggests that the state legislature 
attempted to amend the State Bar Act in 1996 to reflect an intent that 
attorneys would be subject to the Talent Agencies Act. And nothing in the 
 
 92.  Miller-Ayala Act, A.B. 1987, 1996-1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996); see also 1996 
Cal. Stats 4568, Ch. 857 at § 2. 
 93.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895.2(b)(2)(C). 
 94.  Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act, A.B. 1987, 1996-1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
1996), enacted 1996 Cal. Stats. 4568, Ch. 857 (Cal. 1996); An act to amend Section 6106.7 
of, and to add Sections 18897.27, 18897.8, and 18897.9 to, the Business and Professions 
Code, relating to athlete agents, S.B. 1401, 1996-1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) 
[hereinafter Miller-Ayala State Bar Act Amendment], enacted 1996 Cal. Stats. 4577, Ch. 858 
(Cal. 1996). 
 95.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.7 (Deering 2020). 
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legislative record in 1978 or 1986 suggests the state legislature attempted to 
amend the State Bar Act in either of those years to do the same, even though 
the legislature clearly demonstrates its understanding that it could have, vis-
à-vis its adoption of the Miller-Ayala Act. 
Simply put, the California legislature has attempted no analogous 
Miller-Ayala Act provision in the State Bar Act in connection with the Talent 
Agencies Act. In context, then, it can be presumed that the legislature likely 
considered and rejected an express policy making attorneys subject to the 
Talent Agencies Act. At the very least, it is not unreasonable to find from 
the plain language of the statute that, in context, the California legislature 
never intended attorneys to be subject to regulation under the Talent 
Agencies Act. 
 
D. The legislative history of the Talent Agencies Act does not 
demonstrate a legislative intent to prohibit licensed attorneys from 
negotiating employment or engagement agreements on behalf of their 
entertainment clients 
 
As the worldwide leader in entertainment, California has long had an 
interest in regulating the industry to protect workers’ welfare, including 
regulation of artists’ representatives.96 The state’s legislative history 
regulating talent agents and artist managers extends back more than a 
century. And as important as what is in that history is what is wholly absent 
from it. Through every statutory scheme enacted since 1913 relating to talent 
representation, the exclusive focus of the California legislature has always 
been on (i) the licensing and regulation of employment agents in the 
entertainment industries, and (ii) the relationship between the job functions 
of agents and managers. But never in the journals of the legislature is there 
an indication that the state legislature considered – let alone intended – that 
attorneys would be or should be subject to licensing and regulation 
thereunder. 
 
1. Private Employment Agencies Law of 1913 
 
In the earliest part of the twentieth century, California had not yet 
codified statutes by general subject matters as it does today, for example, 
through the modern-day Labor Code and the Business and Professions 
 
 96.  James M. O’Brian III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California’s Talent 
Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 484, n. 
8 (1992). 
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Code.97 Instead, state statutes could be codified into one of four general legal 
codes: the Penal Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the 
Political Code.98 However, a significant number of legislative enactments 
did not fit into any of the above. Such orphan legislation was simply left 
uncodified in the California Statutes. 
In 1903, California passed an act “defining the duties and liabilities of 
employment agents” generally that merely limited commissions to ten 
percent.99 To the extent that talent agents were merely employment agents 
who specialized in finding clients jobs in entertainment, this was the first 
piece of California legislation arguably implicating the conduct of talent 
agents. But it was another ten years before California enacted legislation 
specifically regulating employment agencies in the entertainment industries. 
In 1913, California passed the Private Employment Agencies Law.100 
(herein, the “PEAL”). Uncodified and left in the general California Statutes, 
this new law highly regulated all forms of “employment agency,” including 
licensure requirements and delegation to the state Labor Commission. 
The PEAL merely applied ancient agency law. Importantly, though, it 
specifically defined and brought within its ambit all “theatrical employment 
agenc[ies].”101 And for the first time, entertainment agencies were 
specifically subject to substantive regulation. The PEAL required all 
theatrical agents, as part of the licensing process, to include a statement 
amounting to a background check prior to licensure, and to submit to the 
labor Commission all forms of contracts to be used.102 However, the broader 
licensing requirements and regulations of the PEAL  applied not just to 
theatrical employment agents, but also to all “intelligence office[s], domestic 
and commercial employment agenc[ies], . . . teachers’ employment 
agenc[ies], general employment bureau[s], shipping agenc[ies], nurses’ 
registr[ies], [and] any other agenc[ies] or office[s] for the purpose of 
procuring or attempting to procure help or employment or engagements for 
persons employment or engagements.”103 Conspicuously absent from the 
 
 97.  These subject-matter codes would not be established until 1937. See infra, at 34-35; 
see also 1937 Cal. Stats. 230, Ch. 90. (Cal. 1937) (establishing Cal. Lab. Code); 1937 Cal. 
Stats. 1230, Ch. 399 (Cal. 1937) (establishing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code). 
 98.  Daniel W. Martin, Henke’s California Law Guide, 8th ed., at 45-67 (2006); see also 
LLMC Digital, Description and Holding Information, 1874, California Penal Code, Annot., 
http://www.llmc.com/titledescfull.aspx?type=6&coll=8&div=29&set=99992 (last visited 
July 23, 2020); Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Haymond & Burch 1874); Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 
(Haymond & Burch 1874); Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (Haymond & Burch 1874); Cal. Code. Civ. 
P. Ann. (Haymond & Burch 1874). 
 99.  Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 234-35 (1904) (declaring a 1903 statute 
unconstitutional which placed limitations on commissions). 
 100.  1913 Cal. Stats. 515, Ch. 282 (Cal. 1913) [hereinafter PEAL]. 
 101.  Id. at 515 (§§ 1.3, 1.4). 
 102.  Id. at 520-521 (§§ 15, 16). 
 103.  Id. at 515 (§ 1.2). 
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PEAL, however, was any mention of attorneys. The state regulated attorney 
conduct long prior to the PEAL enactments, going back to the nineteenth 
century.104 But there is no indication in the PEAL provisions themselves as 
passed, or the draft bill language of the PEAL enactments that the California 
state legislature in 1913 intended or even considered the new law’s 
application to attorneys.105 
 
2. The California Labor Code of 1937 
 
In the ensuing years, three occurrences happened pertinent to the 
legislative history of the Talent Agencies Act as it relates to attorneys. First, 
in 1927, California enacted the State Bar Act for the licensure and regulation 
of attorneys;106 a statute that preempts the field of attorney regulation when 
the practice of law is implicated.107 Second, in 1929, the legislature 
established the California Code Commission as a permanent government 
agency to sweepingly and permanently codify the California Statutes, then 
described as existing “in a deplorable condition” and “the worst statutory law 
in the country.”108 Third, in 1937, California enacted the first state Labor 
Code.109 Through this enactment, the state legislature adopted as Part 6 of 
the new Labor Code the previously-uncodified PEAL, including all 
provisions specific to the licensure and regulation of theatrical agents.110 
Simultaneously with enactment of the new Labor Code, California 
modified the PEAL provisions of the new Labor Code (i.e., Part 6) to reflect 
California’s then-infant motion picture industry. Specifically, the legislature 
included in Part 6 of the new Labor Code yet another classification of general 
employment agent: “motion picture employment agencies.”111 The new 
California Labor Code now included in the definition of general 
 
 104.  See Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 242 (1864) (“an attorney of this Court, having been 
admitted as an attorney and counsellor of this Court since its organization under the 
Constitution of the State . . . and otherwise conformed to the rules of this Court as an 
attorney”). 
 105.  Cal. S.B. 1413, 1912-1913 Leg., 40th Sess. (Cal. 1913) (intro’d Cal. Senate J., 40th 
Sess. at 496 (Feb. 3, 1913), amended id. at 669 (Mar. 22, 1913), amended id. at 1077 (Apr. 5, 
1913), enrolled id. at 3038 (May 12, 1913)). 
 106.  In re Attorney Discipline System, 19 Cal.4th 582, 590 (1998). 
 107.  Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 535, 543 (1970) (“the State Bar Act preempts 
the field of regulation of attorneys only insofar as they are ‘practicing law’ under the act—i.e, 
performing services in a representative capacity in a manner which would constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law if performed by a layman”). 
 108.  Nathan M. Crystal, Article, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 
54 WASH. L. REV. 239, 260 (1979). 
 109.  1937 Cal. Stats. 185, Ch. 90 (“An act to establish a Labor Code, thereby 
consolidating and revising the law relating to labor and employment relations”) [hereinafter 
AML]. 
 110.  Id. at 230, Part 6 (codifying Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1550 et seq.). 
 111.  Id. (Cal. Lab. Code § 1552(b)). 
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“employment agencies” two categories pertinent to the entertainment 
industries: theatrical employment agencies and motion picture employment 
agencies.112 But the practical effect was no effect at all. Theatrical 
employment agencies would continue to be regulated in accordance with the 
PEAL, though now codified in the new Labor Code. And motion picture 
employment agencies would also now be licensed and regulated pursuant to 
those same provisions of the same Labor Code. Importantly, however, 
nothing in Part 6 of the new Labor Code included attorneys as “employment 
agencies.” In fact, the State Bar Act never existed under the Labor Code at 
all, but instead was codified in 1939 under the Business and Professions 
Code where it remains to this day – wholly separate from talent agency 
regulation.113 And neither did the legislature amend the then-new Labor 
Code nor the State Bar Act to authorize or prohibit licensed attorneys from 
procuring or negotiating employment or engagement contracts on behalf of 
artists. 
 
3. 1943 Artists’ Managers Law 
 
By World War II, the entertainment business was changing rapidly. In 
addition to attorneys and employment agents, entertainers increasingly were 
reliant on a third member of their professional team: the personal manager. 
And so, in 1943, the state legislature passed the Artists’ Managers Law 
(“AML”), amending the Labor Code to add a separate statutory scheme 
licensing and regulating “artists’ managers.”114 This new statutory scheme 
existed in the same chapter, yet still separate from the PEAL provisions of 
the Labor Code which continued to regulate talent agents. 
Defined as “a person who engages in the occupation of advising, 
counseling, or directing artists in the development or advancement of their 
professional careers,”115 managers were separately licensed and regulated. 
California law did not treat agents and managers as interchangeable. Noting 
the difference in job duties, i.e., that agents procured employment for artists 
while managers advised and counseled them, the AML amendment to the 
Labor Code required a separate license for each job, and permitted people to 
“apply for both an employment agency license and an artists’ manager 
license.”116 In other words, holding one license did not confer privileges on 
the licensee to engage in the other occupation. 
 
 112.  Id. (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1551(a), 1552(a)). 
 113.  See Elsey Hurt, California State Government: An Outline of Its Administrative 
Organization v.2: The Independent Agencies, 1850-1939, Bureau of Pub. Admin., Univ. of 
Cal. at 133 (1939). 
 114.  1943 Cal. Stats. 1326, Ch. 329 (Cal. 1943) (codifying Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1650 et 
seq.) [hereinafter AML Amts.]. 
 115.  Id. at 1326, § 1. 
 116.  Id. at 1327, § 4 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1653). 
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One important aspect of the AML amendments to the Labor Code is the 
residual language that appears in the modern day Talent Agencies Act. At 
that time, the state legislature included a safe harbor for talent managers who 
might otherwise run afoul of the PEAL’s employment agencies regulations. 
Referred to as the “incidental procurement” provision of the AML provisions 
of the Labor Code, this section permitted artists’ managers to procure 
employment and engagements on behalf of artists, but “only in connection 
with and as a part of the duties and obligations of such person under a 
contract with such artist by which such person contracts to render services” 
of an artists’ manager.117 It is in this incidental procurement provision of the 
1943 AML amendments to the Labor Code that the language first appears on 
which the Labor Commission relied in the Solis decision, supra. 
In 1943, the state legislature expressly mandated that a person be 
subject to dual-licensure in order to procure employment as an agent and 
separately to counsel artists as a manager. However, the AML amendments 
to the Labor Code remained conspicuously silent on the application of the 
Labor Code to attorneys. None of the prior drafts of the AML amendments 
suggest the legislature contemplated or intended the Labor Code to require 
the dual or even triple-licensure for persons wishing to counsel clients as 
managers, procure employment as agents and negotiate employment 
contracts as attorneys. Nor did it amend the State Bar Act at that time to 
prohibit licensed attorneys from either counseling, negotiating for, or 
otherwise generally representing their Hollywood clientele. The AML drafts, 
the final form of the Labor Code, and the State Bar Act remained wholly 
silent on the matter. 
 
4. Artist Managers Act of 1959 
 
In 1959, the legislature again amended the Labor Code, this time by 
enacting the Artist Managers Act (AMA). On its face, the AMA merely 
rearranged the Labor Code as it related to regulation of managers. In 1943, 
Chapter 1 of Part 6 of the Labor Code was still, in essence, merely the PEAL. 
Chapter 1 regulated all private employment agencies, including all theatrical 
employment agencies and motion picture employment agencies. And the 
1943 AML amendments merely added the artists’ manager provisions to 
Chapter 1 as sub-chapters relating to all employment agencies. But the 1959 
 
 117.  AML Amts. at 1326, § 1 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1650). A similar law is still on the books 
in New York. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 171(8); also Myles L. Gutenkunst, Note, Talent 
Managers Acting as Agents Revisited: An Argument for California’s Imperfect Talent 
Agencies Act, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENTM’T. L.J. 113, 114-115 (2015) (“New York 
Employment Agency Law shares similar common law roots and statutory provisions but with 
one major exception: incidental booking. A New York talent manager may procure 
employment for the artist where the procurement is incidental to the normal management 
duties for the artist”). 
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AMA did something that no prior artist representative legislation had done. 
It removed all of the artists’ manager provisions from Chapter 1 of the Labor 
Code, and recodified them to Chapter 4.118 
At first glance, this appears to be merely legislative housekeeping. 
However, by re-codifying talent manager regulations separately from 
employment agency regulations, i.e., from theatrical agent and motion 
picture agent regulations, the state legislature signaled its “increased 
realization that ‘the business of procuring employment in the entertainment 
industry . . . is different and in many ways more complex than the business 
of the normal employment agencies the Labor Commission regulates.’”119 
The 1959 AMA retained the incidental procurement language in Section 
1700.4 of the Labor Code, and thus the AMA provisions of the Labor Code 
became the truest progenitor of the Talent Agencies Act as it exists today. 
Nothing in Chapter 1 or Chapter 4 of the Labor Code expressly or 
impliedly suggested an intent to regulate attorneys under any section of those 
chapters of the Labor Code. The legislature did not amend the State Bar Act 
to prohibit attorneys from negotiating artists’ contracts. Nor did the 
legislature amend the State Bar Act to subject attorneys to licensure or 
regulation under the Labor Code instead of the State Bar Act. 
 
5. Employment Agency Act of 1967 
 
In 1967, the state legislature wholly separated talent agents and artists’ 
managers statutorily. With passage of the Employment Agency Act of 1967, 
the California legislature finally created total statutory distinction between 
laws regulating talent agents and laws regulating artists’ managers. The act 
repealed the Labor Code’s PEAL provisions and re-codified them in the 
Business and Professions Code.120 Meanwhile, artists’ managers would 
continue to be regulated by the Labor Code.121 Additionally, and for the first 
time, the PEAL permanently removed from its definition of “employment 
agency” the sub-classifications of theatrical employment agencies and 
motion picture employment agencies. 
Instead, talent agencies presumably were intended to be regulated by 
the Business and Professions Code by virtue of meeting the broader 
definition of an “employment agency” under the 1967 act, as “any . . . 
 
 118.  1959 Cal. Stats. 2920, Ch. 888, § 1 (Cal. 1959)(“Chapter 4 (commencing at Section 
1700) is added to Part 6, Division 2 of the Labor Code”)[hereinafter AMA]. 
 119.  O’Brian, supra note 96, at 494 (quoting Philip R. Green & Beverly R. Green, Talent 
Agents and the New California Act, 1988 ENTM’T., PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 
357, John D. Viera & Robert Thorne eds. (1988)).  
 120.  1967 Cal. Stats. 3557, Ch. 1505, §§ 1,2 (1967)[hereinafter AMA Amts.]. 
 121.  AMA Amts. at 3557, § 1 (codified in Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 9914 [later repealed]) 
(“Nothing in this chapter shall apply to an artists’ manager, as defined or licensed under 
Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700) of Part 6 of Division 2 of the Labor Code”). 
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business . . . which procures, offers, promises or attempts to procure 
employment or engagements for others.”122 Furthermore, no prior talent 
agency (i.e., theatrical employment agencies or motion picture employment 
agencies) received special treatment as they had before. Talent agents, 
theatrical employment agents, and motion picture employment agents were 
simply “employment agents” under the Business and Professions Code;123 
while artists’ managers were simply “artists’ managers” under the Labor 
Code. However, nowhere in the 1967 Employment Agency Law did the state 
legislature amend either the Business and Professions Code or the Labor 
Code to bring licensed attorneys under their regulatory authority. Nor did the 
legislature amend the State Bar Act. 
 
6. Talent Agencies Act of 1978 
 
Finally, in 1978, the state legislature enacted what would become the 
modern-day Talent Agencies Act. The most significant change was that, for 
the first time, talent agents were no longer subject to the general agency 
licensing requirements and regulations of the PEAL’s successor statutes. 
Instead, regulation of talent agents returned to the Labor Code. Once again, 
and permanently, talent agents would be treated differently and specially 
from general employment agents. The means by which this was achieved 
was the de-regulation of artists’ managers combined with stricter regulation 
of talent agents, all by changing two simple words. The Talent Agencies Act 
amended Section 1700.4 of the Labor Code to define a talent agency as “a 
person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, 
promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist 
or artists.”124 Effectively, the amendment merely changed the term “artists’ 
manager” as used in Chapter 4 of the Labor Code to “talent agent.” With this 
simple stroke of a pen, the job of a talent manager in California became 
unlicensed and unregulated. 
However, the 1978 TAA also changed the relationship between agents 
and managers. First, it permitted talent agents to “counsel or direct artists in 
the development of their professional careers.”125 This immediately de-
regulated what formerly was a licensed profession, i.e., the counseling and 
directing of artists, and made it more competitive as managers now had to 
compete with talent agents who were permitted to engage in the same 
 
 122.  Id. (codified at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 9902(a) [later repealed]). 
 123.  It is worth noting that the PEAL is still in force today, having been re-codified from 
the Business and Professions Code to the Civil Code by the Employment Agency, 
Employment Counseling, and Job Listing Services Act of 1989. 1989 Cal. Stats. 2304, Ch. 
704, §§ 1,2 (Cal. 1989). 
 124.  1978 Cal. Stats. 4575, Ch. 1381, § 6 (Cal. 1978) (amending Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4) 
[hereinafter TAA]. 
 125.  Id. (amending Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4). 
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conduct. The 1978 TAA also repealed the incidental procurement provision 
that previously had been a safe harbor for talent managers.126 While 
managers were no longer required to obtain a license “to counsel or direct 
artists in the development of their professional careers,”127 they also were no 
longer permitted to engage in procurement activities unless they were 
licensed under the Talent Agencies Act provisions of the Labor Code.128 
But most importantly, and once again, the state legislature found itself 
concerned exclusively with regulation of talent agents and managers. In the 
greatest seismic shift in the licensing and regulation of artists’ 
representatives in state history, absolutely nothing in the legislative history 
from the 1977-1978 session suggests the legislature considered - let alone 
intended - that the TAA would regulate attorneys under the Labor Code 
instead of the State Bar Act. No committee report and no draft bill ever 
implies such consideration or intent. Furthermore, what is indisputable is that 
while amending the Labor Code through the Talent Agencies Act, the 
California legislature wholly failed to amend the State Bar Act provisions of 
the Business and Professions Code to reflect such changes. 
 
7. 1985 California Entertainment Commission Report 
 
In 1982, the state legislature formed the California Entertainment 
Commission to “study the laws and practices of [California], the State of 
New York, and other entertainment capitals of the United States relating to 
the licensing of agents and representatives of artists in the entertainment 
industry.”129 The commission’s ultimate objective was to “recommend to the 
Legislature a model bill regarding this licensing” and regulatory scheme.130 
In 1985, the Entertainment Commission published its findings.131 And while 
the Entertainment Commission’s purview included representation across all 
the entertainment industries, ultimately the state legislature enacted 
amendments to the Talent Agencies Act in 1986 specific only to the music 
and recording industry.132 These were the last major amendments to the 
Talent Agencies Act. 
 
 126.  See AMA, supra at note 119 (adding Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4); contrast TAA, supra 
at note125 (amending Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4). 
 127.  TAA at § 7 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.5). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  1982 Cal. Stats. 2816, Ch. 682, art. 4 (Cal. 1982) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1701, 1702) 
[hereinafter 1982 TAA Amts.]. 
 130.  Id. (Cal. Lab. Code § 1701). 
 131.  Cal. Entm’t. Comm’n., Rep. of the Cal. Entm’t. Comm’n (1985) https://www.dir.ca. 
gov/dlse/TAC/California%20Entertainment%20Commission%20Report%20-%201985.pdf. 
 132.  1986 Cal. Stats. 1804, Ch. 488, § 2 (amending Cal. Lab. Code to re-create incidental 
procurement provision in Section 1700.4 for people engaged in “procuring . . . recording 
contracts for an artist”) [hereinafter 1986 TAA Amts.]. 
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It is important to note for purposes of examining the legislative history 
of the TAA that while the legislature’s ultimate amendments were quite 
limited in scope, they were broadly considering the TAA’s application across 
all sectors of the entertainment industry. As important is a critique of the 
statutory make-up of the Entertainment Commission itself. The commission 
was statutorily comprised of three licensed talent agents, three personal 
managers, and three artists to the commission. The California Labor 
Commission would sit as the tenth member of the commission.133 
Conspicuously absent, however, was a representative of the entertainment 
bar who could speak for the third branch of artist representation: 
entertainment lawyers. Attorneys had no voice on the commission. 
But furthermore, the commission itself voiced no opinion on 
application of the TAA (or its corollary in other states) to duly-licensed 
attorneys. Fascinatingly, the 39-page report focuses exclusively on the 
relationships between artists and their agents and managers. The word 
“agent” or “agency” is mentioned 34 times (not including its use in quoted 
statutory language). The word “manager” is mentioned 30 times. But the 
number of times the commission mentioned “attorneys” or “lawyers?” Zero. 
The closest the commission ever came to implying that attorneys ought to be 
regulated under the Labor Code instead of the State Bar Act was through the 
use of collective, ambiguous phrases such as “or anyone” or “anyone other 
than a licensed Talent Agent.”134 The commission attached a five-page 
summary at the end of its report titled Summary of Legislation Preceding the 
Talent Agencies Act.135 Therein, the commission focused exclusively on the 
state’s licensing and regulation of artist agents arising out of artists’ concerns 
regarding artist managers. However, at no point therein did the commission 
suggest that artists’ concerns regarding attorneys were also the subject of the 
commission’s research. The clear purpose of the Act was always to protect 
artists from unscrupulous talent agents and unscrupulous artist managers – 
not to create a legal monopoly for talent agents. Other commentators have 
noted the deficiency of the Entertainment Commission’s processes and 
findings.136 While the last amendments pertained only to the recording 
industry, the important consideration is that yet again the California 




 133.  1982 TAA Amts. at 2816, Ch. 682, § 6 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1701). 
 134.  Cal. Entm’t. Comm’n., supra note 131, at 7, 11. 
 135.  Id. at 35-39. 
 136.  See, e.g., Bradley W. Hertz, The Regulation of Artist Representation in the 
Entertainment Industry, 8 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 55, 68 (1988) (“It seems that the California 
Entertainment Commission abdicated its responsibility on the very issue that it was charged 
to resolve. The problem will not go away simply because the Commission has reaffirmed the 
current law”). 
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Simply put, the state assembly never in the eleven decades since 
enactment of the PEAL considered or intended any of its artist representation 
legislation to claw attorneys into the fold. The state assembly has authority 
to statutorily require attorneys to be dually-licensed to engage in certain 
defined agencies. This much is clear from the fact that the state legislature 
clearly and unambiguously exercised such authority when it passed the 
Miller-Ayala Act and amended the State Bar Act to reflect those 
amendments. But absolutely nothing exists in the century-long legislative 
history of the Talent Agencies Act suggesting the legislature intended 
attorneys to be subject to the licensing and regulatory requirements generally 
imposed on talent agents. Never did any of these legislative acts 
simultaneously amend the State Bar Act or the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to reflect such an intent. Nor has any California state court ever 
ruled on the issue. 
Instead, the only authority suggesting as much are a scant number of 
decisions by the California Labor Commission which rely on overly 
simplistic logic and unlawful statutory construction with no regard, 
discussion or consideration of the actual legislative intent behind the Talent 
Agencies Act, supra. While “[t]he construction of a statute by an agency 
charged with its administration is entitled to great weight,” such 
constructions are hardly dispositive. Furthermore, to the extent an 
administrative agency engages in statutory construction, it must adhere to 
actual principles of statutory construction and an informed, detailed 
examination of legislative intent, such as that set forth above and herein.137 
The Labor Commission utterly failed to consider statutory construction 
principles or the legislative history and intent of the Talent Agencies Act. 
 
IV. The Solis Decision Creates Irreconcilable Statutory Conflicts 
Between the Talent Agencies Act and the State Bar Act 
 
A. The Talent Agencies Act’s application to licensed attorneys will be a 
matter of first impression in the California state courts 
 
As noted, the Talent Agencies Act confers on the California Labor 
Commission original jurisdiction of claims arising from violations of the 
statute.138 However, all decisions of the Labor Commission are “subject to 
an appeal within 10 days after determination, to the superior court where the 
same shall be heard de novo.”139 While the TAA was enacted in 1978, the 
 
 137.  See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 138.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44. 
 139.  Id. at § 1700.44(a). 
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Labor Commission did not hear a case against a California-licensed attorney 
in which “practice of law” was asserted as a defense until 2013, when the 
Labor Commission rendered its decision in Solis v. Blancarte. 
The only other case in which “practice of law” by a California-licensed 
attorney was asserted as a defense was Doughty v. Hess.140 However, neither 
Solis nor Doughty was appealed to the California district court. Of the 46 
cases in which the district court took appeals from Labor Commission 
decisions, none of them defined the statute’s phrase “procurement,” let alone 
held that negotiation constitutes per se procurement. Nor did any of them 
examine whether the Talent Agencies Act is so broad as to prohibit duly-
licensed California attorneys from negotiating entertainment employment 
contracts; i.e., practicing law. Therefore, application of the Talent Agencies 
Act to duly-licensed attorneys in California remains a question-of-first-
impression before the California state courts. And no California court is 
constrained by any binding precedent. 
 
B. The Labor Commission’s Solis decision creates an absurd result 
opening both attorneys and talent agents to liability under California law 
 
Contract negotiation and drafting has long been deemed the “practice 
of law” in California. In 1998, the California Supreme Court established 
unequivocally in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior 
Court that the practice of law in California includes giving “legal advice and 
legal instrument and contract preparation, whether or not these subjects were 
rendered in the course of litigation.”141 The Birbrower Court considered 
whether a New York law firm’s activities within the State of California 
constituted the unlicensed practice of law within the state. Defendant law 
firm Birbrower was engaged by a California corporation, ESQ, to provide 
legal services in connection with litigation against ESQ by Tandem 
Computers Incorporated. In the course of providing legal services, one of 
Birbrower’s attorneys, Kevin Hobbs, “returned to California to assist ESQ 
in settling the Tandem matter. While in California, . . . Hobbs also met with 
Tandem representatives to discuss possible changes in [a] proposed 
agreement.”142 It should come as no surprise that there is exactly one phrase 
 
 140.  TAC 39547 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r., April 4, 2017), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/ 
TAC-39547%20Doughty%20v.%20Hess%20040517.pdf; see Lab. Comm’r.’s Office, 
DLSE-Talent Agency Cases, State of Cal., Dep’t. of Ind. Relations, https://www.dir.ca. 
gov/dlse/DLSE-TACs.htm (last viewed Mar. 20, 2020)(the author’s review of the Labor 
Commissioner’s published Talent Agency Cases reveals only two cases since 1971 in which 
the putative agent (i) was a licensed attorney (ii) asserting “practice of law” as a defense to a 
violation of the Talent Agencies Act, to wit, Solis and Doughty). 
 141.  949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998). 
 142.  Id. at 3. 
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defined by “discussing possible changes” to a “proposed agreement”: 
contract negotiation.143 
In 2001, the California Court of Appeals tied Birbrower to the 
negotiation of film-related contracts in California. In Simons v. Steverson, 
petitioner Shawn Simons was an independent film producer and California 
resident. He engaged the New York law firm of Rudolph & Beer, LLP “to 
perform certain legal services for” Simons related to a film he was 
preparing.144 One of the attorneys at the firm, Mark Steverson, was a 
California-licensed attorney who would be Simon’s actual attorney.145 The 
services Steverson was engaged to perform “included, but were not limited 
to . . . the negotiating and drafting of all agreements relating to financing and 
production of the Picture, including but not limited to actors’ agreements, 
location agreements, and crew agreements.”146 Relying on Birbrower, Simon 
contended that Steverson’s actions constituted the practice of law in 
California. The district court “disagreed that the act of negotiating qualified 
as the practice of law.147 But the California Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court. Citing Birbrower, the Simons Court held that Steverson had, 
in fact, “provided legal services under California law,” by “review[ing], 
negotiat[ing] and complet[ing] [an] . . . agreement.”148 Definitely, California 
courts have long recognized that negotiating, preparing and drafting artist 
agreements (i.e., “actors’ agreements . . . and crew agreements”) is within 
the ambit of the “practice of law” in California. 
On the other hand, the California Labor Commission holds in Solis that 
negotiating, preparing and drafting artist agreements constitutes 
“procurement” activities under the Act that are somehow distinct (in total) 
from the attorneys’ full and robust scope of practice. The TAA specifically 
grants original jurisdiction for disputes arising under the Act to the Labor 
Commission.149 The Commission has long been given discretion to interpret 
the Act.150 The Act specifically prohibits unlicensed people from “procuring, 
offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements 
for an artist or artists.”151 And the Labor Commission has long defined the 
 
 143.  People v. Starski, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“‘As the term is 
generally understood . . . in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel and the 
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although such 
matter may or may not be depending in a court.’ Our Supreme Court has also repeatedly held 
that purporting to represent someone, even if only impliedly, while negotiating a settlement 
is likewise included within the practice of law”). 
 144.  106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 203. 
 148.  Id. at 208. 
 149.  CAL. LAB. CODE. § 1700.44(a); also CAL. CODE REGS. § 12022. 
 150.  See Waisbren, supra at 442.  
 151.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b). 
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phrase “procure,” as used in the Talent Agencies Act, to include “the acts 
undertaken in the course of negotiating an agreement for the employment of 
an artist.”152 
Under Simons, the California Court of Appeals implicitly holds that 
negotiation of actors’ and crew agreements constitutes the “practice of law.” 
But under Solis, the California Labor Commission holds that negotiation of 
actors’ and crew agreements constitutes “procurement.”153 In other words, 
“the practice of law” constitutes “procurement,” and vice-versa. And both 
unlicensed procurement and the unlicensed practice of law are respectively 
prohibited by two different statutory schemes. Applying Solis, the Talent 
Agencies Act prohibits attorneys from negotiating contracts for artists (i.e., 
“procuring”) without a talent agency license. Applying Simons, the State Bar 
Act prohibits talent agents from negotiating contracts for artists (i.e., 
“practicing law”) without a law license.154 This creates unintended legal 
dangers for both attorneys and talent agents. 
If Solis is not rejected, both attorneys and talent agents face strong 
sanction if not dually-licensed as both an attorney and a talent agent. Under 
the Talent Agencies Act, the attorney is subject to simple administrative 
penalties for unlicensed procurement. As occurred in Solis, the attorney’s 
representation agreement could be invalidated and the attorney required to 
disgorge any contingent or hourly fees received for legal services. But the 
talent agent faces the greater prospect for sanction. Penalties for the 
unlicensed practice of law under the State Bar Act subject the talent agent 
not just to civil penalties, but also to criminal punishment. As set forth in 
Section 6125 of the State Bar Act, “[a]ny person . . . practicing law who is 
not an active licensee of the State Bar . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor 
punishable by up to one year in a county jail or by a fine of up to one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.”155 
In 1967, the California Court of Appeals announced its decision in 
Buchwald v. Superior Court, a case analyzing the Artists’ Managers Act (a 
precursor to the Talent Agencies Act). The Buchwald Court explicitly held 
that such absurdities arising from statutory construction must be avoided: 
“Statutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction in 
accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers – one 
that will lead to wise policy rather than to mischief or absurdity.”156 And it 
has long been public policy in California that the State Bar Act preempts the 
field in all matters involving the practice of law.157 Therefore, the Talent 
 
 152.  Solis, TAC-27089 at 6, 6. 
 153.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b). 
 154.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6125(a). 
 155.  Id. at § 6125(a). 
 156.  62 Cal. Rptr. at 369. 
 157.  Baron, 469 P.2d at 357. 
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Agencies Act must be construed to recognize the public policy of the State 
Bar Act’s supremacy and avoids the clear absurdity arising from a scenario 
in which California law both empowers and sanctions attorneys and talent 
agents for doing what the law purportedly empowers them to do. The only 
way to avoid such absurdity is to reject the California Labor Commission’s 
Solis interpretation of the Talent Agencies Act as to what does (and does not) 
constitute “procurement” under the statute. Failing to do so creates additional 
absurdities. First, to uphold the administrative court’s interpretation 
effectively would overturn over fifty years of state supreme court 
precedent.158 But more importantly, failing to reject Solis obviates a 
legislative intent spanning more than one hundred years. 
 
C. The State Bar Act and the California Rules of Professional Conduct 
together constitute a separate-and-analogous licensing and regulatory 
scheme sufficiently fulfilling the legislative purposes of the Talent 
Agencies Act 
 
The Talent Agencies Act itself is not the only regulatory mandate to 
consider. In addition to the statute, the Labor Commission is empowered to 
draft regulations for purposes of enforcing the statute. And the Labor 
Commission has done just that, promulgating the General Rules and 
Regulations for Artists’ Managers.159 Together, the Talent Agencies Act and 
the General Rules constitute the regulatory and licensing scheme for talent 
agents in California. However, California courts have suggested that similar 
schemes may act as whole substitutes for the TAA statutory and regulatory 
scheme. 
In 1995, the California Court of Appeals published its decision in 
Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions. In that case, the putative agent at issue 
was a talent manager. The appeals court found that “[u]nlike a talent agent, 
a ‘personal manager’ is not covered by the [Talent Agencies] Act or any 
other statutory licensing scheme.”160 In 2008, the California Supreme Court 
published its decision in Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi. The 
Marathon Court described the regulatory scheme of the Talent Agencies Act 
as the “requirements for how licensed talent agencies conduct their business, 
including a code of conduct, submission of contracts and fee schedules to the 
state, maintenance of a client trust account, posting of a bond, and 
 
 158.  See Mickel v. Murphy, 305 P.2d 993, 995 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (quoting People v. 
Sipper, 142 P.2d 960, 962-963 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)) (“If defendant had only been called upon 
to perform and had only undertaken to perform the clerical service of filling in the blanks on 
a particular form in accordance with information furnished him by the parties,” as opposed to 
negotiating the printed terms (i.e., negotiating the offered terms), . . . he would not have been 
guilty of practicing law without a license”). 
 159.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.29; CAL. CODE REGS. §§12000 et seq. 
 160.  Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (emphasis added). 
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prohibitions against discrimination, kickbacks, and certain conflicts of 
interest.”161 But interestingly, the Marathon Court made an additional 
finding sua sponte. Citing the Waisbren decision, the Marathon Court stated 
that “[n]o separate analogous licensing or regulatory scheme extends to 
personal managers.”162 
The clear implication of these cases is that if a case ever arose in which 
a “separate analogous licensing or regulatory scheme” extends to a putative 
talent agent, the Talent Agencies Act is not intended to require licensing or 
to regulate such a person. California has at various times in its history 
adopted and repealed laws and regulations targeting talent managers. 
However, the state has consistently maintained a separate analogous 
licensing and regulatory scheme for attorneys for nearly a century. That 
scheme is the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In California, licensing and regulation of attorneys predates by decades 
not just the Talent Agencies Act, but all legislative attempts at licensing and 
regulation of talent agencies.163 In 1927, the state legislature adopted the 
State Bar Act.164 And “[i]n 1966, the electorate adopted a provision placing 
the State Bar in the judicial article of the state Constitution. Article VI, 
section 9 of the California Constitution states: ‘The State Bar of California 
is a public corporation. Every person admitted and licensed to practice law 
in this State is and shall be a member of the State Bar.’”165 Today, the State 
Bar Act is codified in the Business & Professions Code and consists of more 
than 200 separate subsections.166 In addition to the substantive provisions of 
the act itself, the State Bar Act also authorizes the California State Bar to 
“formulate and enforce rules of professional conduct for all members of the 
State Bar,” including suspension from practice for any willful breach of those 
rules.167 It is fair to say that together, the State Bar Act and the California 
Rules of Professional Conduct constitute a constitutionally required separate 
licensing and regulatory scheme for attorneys, which is analogous to the 
 
 161.  Marathon, 174 P.3d at 747. 
 162.  Id. (citing Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440-441). 
 163.  In re Application of Weymann, 268 P. 971, 971 (Cal. App. 1928) (“the subject of 
admission to the practice of law in this state, including the procedure therefor, was governed 
by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure”); see In re Disbarment of Collins, 206 P. 
990, 990 (Cal. 1922)(“The petitioner herein applies for an order vacating and setting aside a 
former order of this court made on July 19, 1909, striking from the roll of attorneys and 
counselors the name of said petitioner”); People v. Treadwell, 5 P. 686, 686 (Cal. 1885) (“This 
is a proceeding for the removal of an attorney of this court, brought under Section 288, C. C. 
P.”); Marathon, 174 P.3d at 746 (“The [Talent Agency] Act’s roots extend back to 1913, 
when the Legislature passed the Private Employment Agencies Law and imposed the first 
licensing requirements for employment agents”). 
 164.  In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49, 67 (Cal. 1998). 
 165.  Id. at 52. 
 166.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6243. 
 167.  Id. at §§ 6076, 6077; also cf. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0(a). 
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Talent Agencies Act and the General Rules and Regulations for Artists’ 
Managers as contemplated in Waisbren and Marathon. 
Ultimately, the question becomes whether the State Bar Act and the 
Talent Agencies Act are truly analogous. The first issue is whether the two 
statutes share similar legislative purposes. There can be no doubt that the 
State Bar Act and the Talent Agencies Act do so. While courts have 
recognized that talent agents might otherwise face increased competition 
from others who may engage in similar activity, they have unequivocally 
held that the actual purpose of the Act is to protect artists.168 No court has 
ever held that any legislative purpose of the Act is to statutorily create a 
monopoly favoring talent agents. Similarly, the State Bar Act was enacted 
for the protection of the public in general, including artists. As set forth 
therein, “[p]rotection of the public shall be the highest priority for the State 
Bar of California . . . in exercising [its] licensing, regulatory, and 
disciplinary functions. Whenever the protection of the public is inconsistent 
with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of the public shall 
be paramount.”169 More specifically, the purpose of the Act and its 
regulations is to protect artists from “unscrupulous” talent agents.170 
Meanwhile, the purpose of the State Bar Act and, more specifically, the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, is to protect clients from unscrupulous 
attorneys.171 
The second issue is whether both schemes share similar licensing and 
regulatory requirements to achieve these similar legislative goals. And there 
can be no doubt that the State Bar Act provides similar means – if not 
superior means – to achieve the legislature’s objectives. The first shared 
 
 168.  Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441-442 (“‘Such statutes are enacted for the protection 
of those seeking employment [i.e., the artists].’ . . . The position of the talent agents is that 
anyone who performs the same function as they in procuring employment for an artist should 
be subject to the same statutory and regulatory obligations as they are – nothing more and 
nothing less. . . . Talent agents increasingly find themselves in competition with personal 
managers and others in seeking employment for clients. In the opinion of the talent agents, 
the issue is simply one of fairness: all who seek employment for an artist should be licensed 
or none should be licensed”). 
 169.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6001.1. 
 170.  Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 354 (Cal. 2001). 
 171.  See Sharp v. Next Entm’t. Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 51(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“conflict 
of interest rules are designed to ‘assure the attorney’s absolute and undivided loyalty and 
commitment to the client and the protection of client confidences” [sic]); see Kirk v. First Am. 
Title Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)(“Courts have recognized the 
‘interest in preserving the continuity of the lawyer-client relationship; otherwise, if such 
relationships were easily disrupted . . . the costs of litigation would be even higher, and 
unscrupulous attorneys would have an incentive to seize on strained facts and theories”); see 
Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (“If only ‘actually innocent’ clients can challenge their defense counsel’s excessive or 
unlawful fees then ‘actually guilty’ clients could never seek redress against even the most 
unscrupulous attorneys”). 
 
 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 43:1 40 
regulatory scheme is embodied in the respective licensing requirements 
themselves.172 In order to obtain a license, both prospective talent agents and 
attorneys must submit written applications to their respective licensing 
authorities.173 Both regulatory schemes permit the regulating authority to 
require applicants to submit to background checks into their criminal 
history,174 (including submission of the applicant’s fingerprints),175 and their 
character and moral fitness.176 Both talent agencies and law firms are subject 
to annual reregistration requirements.177 Both talent agency licenses and law 
licenses may be revoked or suspended by the regulating authority for failure 
to comply with their respective statutes, for failures of moral character, and 
for fraud or misrepresentation on an application for such a license.178 Both 
regulating authorities have authority to conduct investigations into the 
conduct of their respective licensees.179 Last, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct provide for a similar contract cancellation remedy in the event of 
their breach.180 Because the purpose of both statutory and regulatory schemes 
is the same, and the statutory, regulatory and rules mechanisms between both 
schemes is sufficiently similar, the State Bar Act/Rules of Professional 
Conduct constitute the separate-but-analogous licensing scheme 
contemplated by the Marathon and Waisbren courts. 
In fact, the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct together 
provide for a better and more efficient regulatory scheme to protect writers 
and other Hollywood artists than the Talent Agencies Act ever will. Bear in 
mind that the dispute between the ATA and the WGA came to a head 
specifically because talent agents have long been engaged in conduct that 
violates their fiduciary responsibilities to their clients – the writers.181 The 
Talent Agencies Act does absolutely zero to protect writers from this type of 
 
 172.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6060,6125. 
 173.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.6; Cal. R. of Court R. 9.9.5 (to comply with Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 6054); see also State Bar of California, Website, Fingerprinting Rule 
Requirement FAQs, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Attorney-Regulation/Fingerprint 
ing-Rule-Requirements/Fingerprinting-FAQ (last viewed Mar. 6, 2020). 
 174.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.7; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6054. 
 175.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.6; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6054. 
 176.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.7; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6054, 6060, 6060.2. 
 177.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.10; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6161.1. 
 178.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.21; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6077; generally CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE 6075 et seq. 
 179.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6043, 6044, 6060.2, 6168. 
 180.  Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc., 425 P.3d 1, 9 
(Cal. 2018) (“a contract or transaction involving attorneys may be declared unenforceable for 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct”). 
 181.  See generally Smith, supra note 25, at 193-221 (in-depth consideration of fiduciary 
duties Hollywood talent agents owe their clients and conflicts arising therefrom in context of 
packaging). 
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agency conduct and has left a gaping hole permitting the proliferation of 
packaging deals among Hollywood talent agents. 
A major point of contention is that writers and other artists have 
discovered the TAA acts not as a bulwark against unscrupulous talent 
marketers, but instead is an entrée for predatory representatives. In 2015, the 
Los Angeles Times printed an exposé series on scams in the entertainment 
industry titled Selling Stardom. In one of those stories, multiple clients of 
former talent agent Lynn Venturella complained of her predatory behavior. 
According to the piece, Venturella was “one of the hundreds of talent agents 
operating on the fringes of Hollywood, where the clients are mostly character 
actors, fledgling screenwriters, workaday directors, even unknown 
wannabes.”182 After becoming victims of embezzlement and other fraudulent 
practices, “several past clients of Venturella said the fact that her agency was 
state-licensed – and maintained a required $50,000 bond,” pursuant to the 
Talent Agencies Act, “made them comfortable with signing” with her.183 The 
absence of a comprehensive code and reporting infrastructure has only 
emboldened licensed talent agents to engage in the abuses the Talent 
Agencies Act was intended to halt. Attorneys, on the other hand, have always 
been prevented from engaging in abuses the Talent Agencies Act and 
General Rules fail to prevent. 
The first major difference between the Talent Agencies Act scheme and 
the State Bar Act scheme is that attorneys must successfully demonstrate 
competence to practice law before being granted a license, whereas talent 
agents do not. First, California attorneys are required to complete an 
extensive training program in the practice of law, either by graduating from 
an accredited law school or completing a legal apprenticeship with an 
attorney or judge in the state.184 Then, attorneys must successfully pass an 
“examination in professional responsibility or legal ethics,” traditionally the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).185 Finally, 
attorneys must pass the California bar exam, which is designed to ensure the 
attorneys are minimally competent in the practice of law.186 There is no 
corollary educational or testing requirement for talent agents to prove 
minimal competence. Nothing in the Talent Agencies Act or the General 
Rules and Regulations for Artists’ Managers requires a person to go through 
a training or educational process, to pass an examination on business ethics 
or fiduciary duties of agents, or to pass an examination which generally tests 
 
 182.  Daniel Miller, Selling Stardom: A talent agent and a trail of unhappy clients, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-selling-star 
dom-20151122-htmlstory.html. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6060(e) (1939).  
 185.  Id. at § 6060(f). 
 186.  Id. at § 6060(g). 
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their competence to procure employment for artists. While many of the large 
agencies offer training, neither the Act nor the regulations require it prior to 
the state’s granting of a license under the Act. 
The second major difference is the Rules for Professional Conduct for 
attorneys. There simply is no analogous regulatory scheme for talent agents 
under the Talent Agencies Act. The Marathon Court suggested that the Act 
and regulations establish a “code of conduct” for talent agents. Certainly the 
Act and regulations mandate specific requirements agents must fulfill to 
conform to the Act itself, such as posting copies of their licenses and the Act 
in their office,187 posting a surety bond,188 and prescribing forms for agency 
agreements.189 However, these do not rise to the level of ethical duties 
broadly regulating the relationship between the talent agents and the artists. 
The Code of Professional Conduct for attorneys, on the other hand, 
specifically regulates the attorney-client relationship and prescribes broad 
duties attorneys owe to their clients. 
Chapter 1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically relates to 
the Lawyer-Client Relationship. Therein, the rules set forth broad duties that 
attorneys owe to their clients, the most important of which is “[t]he duty of 
undivided loyalty” to the client as set forth in Rule 1.7.190 This most 
important rule specifically prohibits the same conflicts-of-interest the talent 
agents are accused of that led directly to the showdown in 2019. Rule 1.7 
provides that: “[a] lawyer shall not, without informed written consent from 
each client . . . represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to 
another client in the same or a separate matter.”191 And a “lawyer shall not, 
without informed written consent from each affected client . . . represent a 
client if there is a significant risk the lawyer’s representation of the client 
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to or relationships 
with another client, a former client or a third person, or by the lawyer’s own 
interests.”192 In one rule, the foundations are laid to prevent all abuses alleged 
against the talent agents, if talent agents were subject to such a rule or its 
corollary. 
The commentary to Rule 1.7 states that a “directly adverse conflict” can 
arise in a number of ways, including a lawyer’s “representation of more than 
one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict.”193 
It should go without saying that if an attorney represented both the buyer and 
seller of real estate that such an attorney would run afoul of Rule 1.7. 
 
 187.  CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.5, 1700.28. 
 188.  Id. at § 1700.15. 
 189.  Id. at § 1700.23. 
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However, nothing under the Talent Agencies Act or the regulations prohibits 
a talent agent from representing both the buyer and seller of a screenplay or 
of a television writer’s services. Rule 1.8.1 explicitly forbids an attorney 
from “knowingly acquir[ing] [a] . . . pecuniary interest adverse to a 
client.”194 Combined with Rule 1.8.6, which mandates that even if an 
attorney is compensated by somebody other than the client that the attorney’s 
sole duty is to the client, an attorney would never be permitted to accept a 
fee from an opposing party in a negotiation. However, nothing in the TAA 
or its regulations has prevented talent agents from negotiating packaging fees 
from studios and networks, often to the financial detriment (and creative 
detriment) of its own clients. 
And Rule 1.8.1 also explicitly forbids an attorney from “entering into a 
business transaction with a client,” because it would require the attorney to 
negotiate against himself. In other words, an attorney would run afoul of the 
rule if the attorney entered negotiations to hire his own client while 
purporting to represent the client. It prevents self-dealing. However, nothing 
in the TAA prevents talent agents from entering into business transactions 
with the artists they represent. As the major talent agencies have turned into 
content production companies – hiring entities – this has given rise to the 
self-dealing conflicts that have arisen as the talent agencies have become 
representatives of their clients in negotiations with the talent agencies 
themselves. Suffice to say, the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for attorneys do not merely provide an alternative regulatory 
scheme to the Talent Agencies Act; together they actually constitute a better 
regulatory scheme to protect attorneys’ clients who are Hollywood writers 
and other artists. 
 
D. The Labor Commission’s Solis decision results in the Talent 
Agencies Act’s interference with the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
and therefore unreasonably interferes with the State Bar Act and the 
attorney-client relationship 
 
When applying Solis, the Talent Agencies Act unreasonably interferes 
with the California Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys because it 
statutorily subrogates an attorney’s ethical duties to the client to the 
discretion of the talent agent. In Solis, the Labor Commission cites its 
decision in Danielewski for the proposition that under the Talent Agencies 
Act, “an unlicensed person may nevertheless participate in negotiating an 
employment contract for an artist, provided he or she does so ‘in conjunction 
with, and at the request of a licensed talent agent.’”195 This unreasonably 
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interferes with an attorney’s responsibilities under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to act on behalf of and at the instruction of the client alone. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct set forth one overarching rule: 
undivided loyalty to the client.196 As set forth in the first chapter, “[l]oyalty 
and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship 
to a client.” Rule 2.1 requires that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall 
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice” to the 
client alone.197 All other attorney duties flow from this maxim. For instance, 
Rule 1.2 states that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning 
the objectives of representation,” and that “a lawyer may take such action  
on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the 
representation.”198 
But in furtherance of Rule 1.7’s duty of undivided loyalty, attorneys are 
not simply mandated to render independent professional judgment in the 
course of their representation of a client. The rules of professional conduct 
create a de facto regime in which attorneys are absolutely prohibited from 
taking direction from or relinquishing control of the representation to any 
person other than the client. For instance, Rule 1.8.6 expressly prohibits an 
attorney from “enter[ing] into an agreement for, charg[ing], or accept[ing] 
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless 
there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment 
or with the lawyer-client relationship.”199 Rule 5.3, while traditionally 
examined in the context of legal assistants and outside experts, clearly places 
the ultimate responsibility of a representation on the lawyer and not on the 
non-lawyer.200 And Rule 5.5 explicitly prohibits attorneys from “knowingly 
assist[ing] a person in the unauthorized practice of law” within the state.201 
A talent agent who is unlicensed as an attorney is clearly engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law in California, supra. 
These rules were specifically drafted decades ago, in their original 
form, to protect the public and the client. But the Labor Commission’s Solis 
decision unreasonably interferes with these rules. By suggesting that an 
attorney may negotiate a talent contract only “in conjunction with, and at the 
request of a licensed talent agent,” the Labor Commission effectively neuters 
the long-standing rule that an attorney’s duties are owed solely to the client, 
and that the client shall direct and control the representation. Furthermore, it 
interferes with the rules because it creates a direct conflict wherein the 
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attorney not only is unauthorized to supervise the non-lawyer in the 
representation (i.e., the talent agent), but is also subject to that person’s 
direction. Solis sets the stage for an inevitable showdown: who controls the 
negotiation with a studio or network when an attorney knows that the agent 
is dragging his or her heels to get a packaging fee even  though the client is 
ready to close the deal? 
The Labor Commission’s Solis/Danielewski subrogation requirement 
endangers the attorney’s representation because it would lead to conflict 
between the TAA director of the representation (i.e., the talent agent) and the 
State Bar Act director of the representation (i.e., the writer or other talent). 
What is the attorney’s duty if the agent insists that a packaging fee be 
negotiated? What is the attorney’s duty if the attorney knows the agent is 
trying to get the writer to take a lower fee? What is the attorney’s duty in a 
negotiation if the client’s agency is also the adverse party, such as a 
production company owned by the agency? Is the attorney’s duty to take 
direction solely from the agent, in accordance with Solis and Danielewski? 
Or is the attorney’s duty to take direction solely from the client, in 
accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct? The Labor 
Commission’s interpretation of the Act creates these direct conflicts with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, despite the fact that the rules are set forth by 
the California State Bar pursuant to its authority under the state 
constitution202 and the State Bar Act.203 These conflicts cannot be resolved 
except by rejection of the Labor Commission’s holding as set forth in Solis 
and Danielewski. 
 
V. Attorney Exemption from the Talent Agencies  
Act More Reasonably Conforms to the Legislative Purpose of the 
Statute and Greater Public Policy 
 
In Solis, the Labor Commission placed too much emphasis on the black 
letter of the Talent Agencies Act instead of construing the statute in the 
context of its actual legislative purpose. The Solis construction effectively 
leaves the rank-and-file artist without competent representation and creates 
a fertile environment in which the abuses it was intended to protect against 
actually incubate and thrive instead. Case in point, even with the Talent 
Agencies Act in place, the writers it was intended to protect protested abuses 
the statute failed to protect against. Had the statute fulfilled its purpose, those 
complaints would not have arisen in the first place. The Solis decision has 
merely given the talent agents legal grounds on which to fight for their piece 
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of the pie, at the expense of their principals - the creative clients they are 
supposed to be fighting for instead. In short, the Talent Agencies Act and the 
Labor Commission have failed the people placed under their care by the state 
legislature. 
In addition to the legal reasons California should reject Solis, the state 
should exempt attorneys from the statute’s licensing requirements and 
regulation for a myriad of sound public policy reasons. First among them is 
that the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys 
provide not simply a “separate analogous licensing [and] regulatory 
scheme,” but that the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct 
provide a licensing and regulatory scheme that is actually better at achieving 
the legislative aims of the Talent Agencies Act, supra. Other public policy 
benefits include the following: 
 
A. Attorney exemption results in no legal or actual conflict between 
agents and attorneys 
 
Nothing in either the Talent Agencies Act or the State Bar Act actually 
prevents artists from engaging the services of both an agent and an attorney. 
The common practice within the motion picture industry is for artists to have 
both. Even by rejecting Solis and expressly exempting attorneys from 
regulation under the Talent Agencies Act, nothing prevents the writer, actor 
or director from engaging the services of both an agent and an attorney, 
except perhaps agents who refuse to work with attorneys.204 The only 
conflict arises from ATA’s suggestion that the Talent Agencies Act’s actual 
purpose was to create a statutory monopoly for talent agents.205 While there 
is no doubt that an unintended consequence of the statute was creation of 
such a monopoly, no court has ever held that preventing competition against 
talent agents was considered – let alone adopted – as a reason for enacting 
the statute. Nor has any legislative material or history suggested this. Instead, 
the only legislative purpose ever identified by the courts is the protection of 
artists from “unscrupulous” talent marketers. Because the ATA’s 
interpretation falls so far afield from the actual, true object of the statute, this 
economic conflict is irrelevant. Preventing competition from attorneys is not 
a purpose. Nor is it even unfair if it were, in fact, to occur because agents are 
not effectively shut out of the business. If ever the competition is unfair, it is 
because attorneys have the greater burden to bear in their licensing and 
regulation. 
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B. Attorney exemption is more consistent with attorney licensing 
exemptions in other states and licensed professions 
 
Exempting attorneys from the statute would bring consistency to 
licensing and regulation of “practice of law” activities across a variety of 
professions in California, as well as other states. In many circumstances, 
non-lawyers have been allowed to offer legal services. Historically, these 
have included non-lawyers at banks, who “are permitted to draft routine 
mortgages and non-lawyers are permitted to execute these legal documents 
with blank clients.”206 In the real estate industry in most states, including 
California, non-lawyers have been “given the power to execute contracts on 
residential property in which the agent holds a commission,” similarly to 
sales agents in the Hollywood industries.207 Accounting firms have been 
permitted to expand their consulting services to include estate planning, 
litigation support, valuation and business planning advice, and financial 
planning.208 Certified, licensed legal assistants are permitted to do a wide 
variety of activities that would constitute the practice of law in the state. An 
interpretation of the Act as a conformance with the State Bar Act, infra, 
would bring it in line with similar exemptions for other professions, and 
bring consistency. 
 
C. Attorney exemption provides better protections and access to legal 
aid for below-the-line cast and crew 
 
The Talent Agencies Act, as construed in the Labor Commission’s Solis 
decision, is simply too broad. It does not cover employment agencies only 
for above-the-line creative talent like actors, writers and directors. The term 
“talent,” as used in Section 1700.4, brings under its auspices anybody who 
represents any person who works on a movie or television show. In effect, it 
requires every person who works on a film or television show to obtain an 
agent simply to have an attorney review a contract for employment. The state 
of California has no interest in compelling assistant make-up artists and key 
grips to (i) find an agent, and (ii) pay a commission to an agent simply to 
have access to an attorney who can review an employment or engagement 
contract. No worker in any other industry in California is subjected to such 
an onerous requirement simply to obtain work or have an employment 
contract reviewed and negotiated by their legal counsel. 
 
 206.  John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Article, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
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D. Attorney exemption provides better protections and access to legal 
assistance for up-and-coming above-the-line talent 
 
The Talent Agencies Act creates yet another de facto caste system in 
Hollywood. Agents’ livelihoods are dependent on talent, and they have 
become more risk-averse over time. This is evident from their recent forays 
into content acquisitions, packaging deals, and the evolution of talent agency 
into a volume business. Whereas the Talent Agencies Act permits agents to 
engage in development of their clients, agents today are overwhelmingly less 
interested in doing so. After all, since they are dependent on an artist’s talent 
for packages (and the few remaining commissions taken), they do not take 
risks on new talent. Instead, agents favor a greater number of established 
clients who have proven their ability to encourage packaging deals. 
More often, up-and-coming talent have found agencies to be closed 
shops, taking only solicited materials and rejecting even simple query letters. 
This, in effect, leaves the up-and-coming writer, actor or director without 
competent representation. Other commentators have noted the disparity 
caused by the Talent Agencies Act itself: 
Yet, who is the [Talent Agencies] Act really protecting if the manager 
of a band that cannot get an agent will not (because he or she cannot) 
negotiate (or assist the band in negotiating) a performance in a bar, or at a 
wedding, or at a party. [] And what about the talent agent at one of the big 
three agencies in Los Angeles, who (recently), when one of their actress 
clients told them that she now had an attorney and that she would like them 
to negotiate her future deals in conjunction with that attorney, responded, 
“we don’t work with lawyers.” Is it really the artist that is being protected by 
the Act, or is it the agent? 
What about an actor who does not have the clout of Tom Cruise or 
Sylvester Stallone, or even Gary Cole or Jennifer Rubin? Tom Cruise gets 
the Creative Artists Agency’s full and complete attention every time he 
sneezes; do other actors that are not of his stature? . . . So when the agent 
says, ‘I don’t work with lawyers’ or ‘I don’t work with managers,’ what is 
the actor to do, and how does the Act protect him in that situation? 
There are many fine actors that cannot even get an agent. Does the Act 
really protect them? And what about the actors who lives [sic] outside of Los 
Angeles, where there is not such an abundance of agents – does the Act 
protect them?209 
While such commentary appears to focus on actors and musicians, the 
critique of the statute – just as the statute itself – applies to all procurers of 
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employment for all artists. And therefore, the critique is equally applicable 
to Hollywood writers. 
If engaging the services of an agent is a prerequisite for an up-and-
coming artist to engage the services of an attorney, then what is the artist to 
do if no agent will represent them? In such a way, the Talent Agencies Act 
serves only as an obstacle to the artists’ protection. But for Solis, the Talent 
Agencies Act would not prohibit a licensed attorney from drafting, making, 
fielding and/or negotiating offers and contracts for such up-and-coming 
talent who may receive no interest from a talent agent. Attorneys are less 
dependent on an artists’ talent because whereas talent agents are required by 
law to be compensated only through commissions,210 attorneys are permitted 
to take hourly fees to review and negotiate contracts. If up-and-coming artists 
are effectively regulated out of the ability to retain the services of attorneys 
because an agent will not sign them first, then they are wholly without 
representation. This is clearly an unintended consequence of the legislature, 
and must be avoided. 
 
E. Attorney exemption prevents unintended protectionist and anti-
competitive consequences of the Labor Commission’s Solis decision, 
which have harmed the artists the Talent Agencies Act was enacted to 
protect 
 
The Labor Commission’s interpretation of the Act places an undue 
burden on the public because it is protectionist and anti-competitive, which 
irrationally limits access to competent legal counsel and limits artists’ 
options to choose their own representatives. First, by creating a dual-
licensing regime, attorneys are forced to take on extra costs in their practice 
for what they otherwise would be permitted to do. As in any industry, those 
costs are then passed along to the public, in a time when Americans across 
the country struggle to afford legal assistance of any kind.211 Other 
commentators have advocated for an increased allowance on the part of 
states to permit non-lawyers to practice law in limited circumstances in order 
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to respond to this crisis.212 In an age when the film industry is more and more 
dominated by middle class, rank-and-file filmmakers instead of high-budget 
studios and networks, legal costs must not be allowed to be artificially 
inflated by a statutory requirement that attorneys carry an additional license 
that offers nothing to the client. This is a matter of the public’s access to 
justice and competent legal counsel. 
Second, much to the chagrin of the talent agents, this holding would 
likely lead to greater competition between attorneys and talent agents. But 
such reservations are hypocritical. When the Talent Agencies Act was first 
enacted in 1978, it unintentionally created the monopoly that arguably exists 
today. Prior to that, agents and managers competed to procure engagements 
(the incidental procurement provision of the Labor Code then still being 
law), and yet there was no great outcry from the ATA. While monopolization 
favoring talent agents has long been debunked as the legislature’s intent in 
enacting the TAA, supra, the public is actually better off for such 
competition. Cars replaced horses and buggies, and video killed the radio 
star. Just as writers once had the option to rely on both agents and managers, 
the public should not be denied the choice of using an agent or attorney to 
negotiate their employment contracts and sales of their intellectual property. 
Some creatives may prefer to utilize the services of an attorney alone. 
For instance and perhaps most famously among them is Bill Murray, who 
fired his agents in favor of his attorney to field offers from filmmakers.213 
Artists of a lower professional stature will not be regulated out of the market 
for competent representation, because unlike talent agents who rely 
exclusively on the talent of their clients to make a living, attorneys may not 
find themselves so constrained. This gives the up-and-coming screenwriter 
an opportunity to engage his attorney uncle for a first-time gig instead of 
having to cross his fingers and hope that an agent will take an interest in him 
simply to negotiate a low-dollar option agreement. This gives established 
artists, like Murray, the right to choose for themselves whether they need 
agents in their lives at all, or if they simply need an attorney to negotiate 
offers when they come in. On the other hand, the middle-tier artist may prefer 
a talent agent whose job is to actually track down offers and be a salesman, 
whereas an attorney may simply field offers as they come to the artist. The 
public’s freedom of choice in this matter should be paramount. 
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VI. The Talent Agencies Act Must Either be Legislatively 
Amended or Legally Construed to Resolve the Foregoing 
Absurdities and  
Conflicts Created by the Labor Commission’s Solis Decision, and 
to Protect the Public 
 
A. Ideally, the California legislature will utilize the New York Bar 
Association’s approach to statutorily resolve the foregoing conflicts 
 
The 1985 Entertainment Commission was formed specifically to survey 
the law of entertainment states and capitals and to aid the California 
legislature in the drafting of the Talent Agencies Act as a model statute, 
supra. However, the modern-day Talent Agencies Act lands far afield from 
this target, especially in light of the California Labor Commission’s decision 
in Solis. 
In 2015, attorneys in the other great American entertainment capital 
took issue with California’s Solis decision. That year, the New York State 
Bar Association’s Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section (“NYBA-
EASL”) drafted and proposed legislation specifically exempting attorneys 
from the licensing requirements of talent agencies.214 In 2017, the New York 
City Bar Association’s Entertainment Law Committee (“NYCBA-ELC”) 
drafted a memorandum in support of the NYBA-EASL’s proposed 
legislation.215 
An important distinction between the New York law and the California 
law is that New York retains an “incidental procurement” provision for non-
agents, whereas California has unequivocally rejected this safe-harbor.216 
While the NYBA-EASL and NYCBA-ELC both support an interpretation 
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that attorneys would be covered under this exemption,217 they note the risk 
that New York courts may be influenced by the California Labor 
Commission’s Solis decision.218 In proposing a statutory amendment 
unequivocally exempting attorneys from licensing requirements and 
regulation under the New York laws, both the NYBA-EASL and NYCBA-
ELC note the extraordinary licensing requirements and strict disciplinary 
measures to which attorneys are subjected, supra.219 The NYBA-EASL also 
notes that attorneys are statutorily exempted from licensing requirements in 
many other industries, and that they play a unique role in the representation 
of artists: 
 
The role of the entertainment attorney is particularly unique 
in that the attorney’s primary role is to review and negotiate 
contracts in the best interest of the artist client. Entertainment 
attorneys generally understand the business and develop significant 
contacts in the entertainment industries that may prove beneficial 
for the artists they represent. Failure to exempt attorneys from the 
agency license requirement may prevent attorneys from fully 
advocating for or acting on behalf of their clients. 
 
. . . 
Even though the current statutes pertaining to theatrical employment 
agencies do not specifically exclude attorneys, [the NYSB-EASL] believe[s] 
that the licensure obligations were meant for non-attorneys who, while not 
held to the same professional, regulatory, and ethical standards imposed 
upon attorneys, must comply with some measure of requirements designed 
to protect the public.220 
 
While New York has yet to implement the NYSB-EASL and NYCBA-
ESL amendments to its talent agencies laws, New York attorneys have made 
a highly persuasive case to the Empire State’s legislature for doing so. If 
California truly wants the Talent Agencies Act to become adopted as a model 
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talent representation statute across all jurisdictions, it would do well to take 
the critiques of New York’s attorneys to heart. The California legislature 
needs to take up the amendment of the statute to statutorily reject the Solis 
construction, and to unequivocally exempt attorneys from its licensing 
requirements and regulations. 
 
B. Alternatively, or at least until the state legislature acts, California 
courts should construe the Talent Agencies Act as a statutory 
exemption from liability for the unauthorized practice of law as 
permitted under the State Bar Act 
 
Until the California state legislature amends the Talent Agencies Act to 
exempt attorneys from the statute’s requirements, California courts have 
built into the California code a judicial means of resolving the conflict. 
Section 6126 of the Business and Professions Code (i.e., of the State Bar 
Act) prohibits practicing law without a license. However, that is not the sum 
total of its effect. Section 6126 prohibits from practicing law without an 
attorney’s license “[a]ny person . . . who is not an active licensee of the State 
Bar, or otherwise authorized pursuant to statute or court rule to practice law 
in this state.”221 In other words, the State Bar Act provides a statutory safe 
harbor in which the Talent Agencies Act already lies. The State Bar Act 
expressly authorizes certain individuals who are licensed as talent agents to 
engage in the practice of law (i.e., offering, accepting, drafting and 
negotiating contracts) without being licensed as attorneys in California. Until 
such time as the state legislature amends the Talent Agencies Act, California 
courts would be well advised to use this as a simple means of addressing the 
conflict because it prevents absurd outcomes in enforcement, better protects 
the intended beneficiaries of the act (i.e., the artists), and addresses a 
multitude of public policy concerns in which the Talent Agencies Act is 




EXT. HOLLYWOOD – SUMMER 2020 
Much happened in the year following termination of the AMBA and the 
Writers’ Guild’s installation of the CCFA as the union’s new franchise 
agreement. In the days immediately following AMBA’s effective 
termination, more lawyers got involved. On April 17, 2019, the Writers 
Guild and a handful of individual writers, including David Simon, filed a 
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lawsuit in state court against the Big Four talent agencies WME, CAA, UTA 
and ICM.223 The complaint alleged that the agencies are liable for breaches 
of fiduciary duties and unfair business practices. In June 2019, the agencies 
punched back, filing a separate lawsuit in federal court against the Writers 
Guild for violation of antitrust laws, alleging the WGA engaged in “wanton 
abuse of union authority” by organizing and leading an “unlawful group 
boycott” of writers against the agencies, which included “inducing certain 
unlicensed . . . lawyers into joining the conspiracy by telling them that they 
should perform the work of boycotted talent agents even though it is illegal 
for them to do so,” alluding to the Solis decision.224 In August 2019, the 
Guild dropped its claims in state court and filed them as counter-claims in 
the federal antitrust case brought by the agencies.225 In February 2020, the 
federal district court in Los Angeles ordered the Guild and the agencies to 
mediation, where the case remains today.226 
Aside from the courtroom wrestling matches between the Guild and the 
agents, the rank-and-file screenwriter was forced to enter the 2019 and 2020 
staffing seasons without their agency representatives. However, the stand-
off did not stop television and movies from getting made. It merely changed 
the process. Showrunners, staff writers and screenwriters found themselves 
soliciting pitches and meetings from writers directly, without needing to 
contact their agents first. Writers directly solicited employment and 
engagements directly through Guild-generated Internet submission boards, 
“self-advocacy, direct submission, and Twitter boosts” like 
#WGASolidarityChallenge and #WGAStaffingBoost.227 At bars throughout 
Los Angeles, producers, showrunners, and writers met in person at mixers 
thrown whereby writers and employers could meet each other directly. Most 
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showrunners and writers found the “new normal” the same or even better 
than the old normal. Krista Vernoff, showrunner of Grey’s Anatomy, noted 
that her new writing staff was “the most diverse, inclusive group I’ve ever 
hired. It took extra effort for sure, but it was actually fun.”228 For 
showrunners like David Simon, however, almost nothing changed: “after 25 
years in this game, I haven’t once hired a writer who was introduced to me 
by an agent.”229 
Once offers were solicited and made directly, though, the writers relied 
on their professional representatives to negotiate those deals. A minority of 
writers used backchannels and clandestine tactics to engage their ex-
agents.230 But many writers found help from their attorneys, who have been 
“forced . . . to walk a legal tightrope” thanks to Solis.231 In the highest-profile 
deals, writers and showrunners appeared to have relied on their attorneys 
alone in efforts to remain aboveboard. For example, Game of Thrones 
creators David Benioff and D. B. Weiss used the services of their attorney 
alone in negotiating a $200 million deal with Netflix.232 
On May 16, 2019, the Verve agency, unaffiliated with the ATA, became 
the first prominent talent agency to sign the CCFA, thus giving rise to its 
nickname: The Verve Agreement.233 Within three months, roughly 75 
boutique agencies signed onto the CCFA’s terms.234 Starting in the summer 
of 2019, many mid-tier Hollywood talent agencies finally capitulated and 
began to accept the terms of the new CCFA. Within a year, major firms The 
Gersh Agency and Paradigm signed onto the new franchise agreement and 
code of conduct.235 By April 2020, the hold-outs remained the Big Four 
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agencies: CAA, ICM, UTA and WME.236 In July 2020, UTA crossed the line 
and became the first of the Big Four to drop its lawsuit and sign the CCFA.237 
However, a year later, the standoff continues with CAA, ICM and WME still 
locked in their lawsuit with the WGA. 
But even assuming every agency in Hollywood accepts the terms of the 
CCFA, the issue is not moot. The agreement covers only the relationship 
between Guild writers and franchised agencies. It does not cover the 
thousands of non-union writers creating scripts for independent films and 
series. Nor does the agreement cover the relationship between the tens of 
thousands of actors, directors, musicians and other statutory “artists” and 
their talent agents who work on the fringes of the industry, sometimes for 
jobs paying less than minimum wage. It is this largest part of the industry – 
the up-and-comers, the rank-and-file, the non-stars – who must rely 
exclusively on the protections of laws like the Talent Agencies Act because 
no union will have them yet. If the law will not protect them, then these 
artists ought to be able to rely on competent and ethical legal counsel to act 
on their behalf. 
The Association of Talent Agents is incorrect in its assertion that 
attorneys are prohibited from negotiating employment contracts and sales 
agreements on behalf of writers in the film and television industries in 
California. While the association relies on Solis, such reliance is flawed. No 
California court has ever adopted the Labor Commission’s interpretation of 
the Talent Agencies Act. Nor does the statute or legislative history support 
the Labor Commission’s interpretation of the Act. Instead, California courts 
are cautioned that adopting this interpretation invariably will lead to absurd 
results and conflicts with attorneys’ duties under the state constitution, the 
State Bar Act and the California Rules for Professional Responsibility. 
Instead, California courts should interpret the Talent Agencies Act as a 
statutory exemption from liability for the unauthorized practice of law. This 
simple construction of the Act provides several benefits, both legal and 
practical. Legally, this construction it is expressly permitted not only by the 
State Bar Act, but also as a “separate analogous licensing scheme” implied 
in the California courts’ prior holdings construing application of the Talent 
Agencies Act. Legally, this makes it internally consistent between both 
statutes. It also is consistent with the clear policy of the legislature as 
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evidenced not only by the plain language of the Talent Agencies Act today, 
but also through its century-long legislative history. 
The practical policy reasons for this interpretation are clear, too. First, 
this holding gives the public a greater right of choice when it comes to artists’ 
representatives: writers can choose a talent agent or an attorney, which 
expands the labor market for artists’ representatives. But this does not 
prevent an artist from retaining the services of both a talent agent and an 
attorney. This also gives artists a greater choice in her protections. A writer 
may engage the services of a talent agent unlicensed as an attorney due to 
such agent’s reputation, even if the tradeoff is lesser protections in relation 
to potential conflicts-of-interest. Or a writer may engage the services of an 
attorney unlicensed as a talent agent to obtain greater protection through the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, even if the tradeoff requires more time and 
money on the client’s part to obtain an initial offer. Furthermore, giving this 
choice to writers better ensures against the harms the Talent Agencies Act 
was enacted to prevent in the first place which is protection of the artists in 
the first place. Nothing in the Talent Agencies Act has protected artists from 
the abuses arising from packaging deals and the attendant conflicts-of-
interest. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct do exactly that. 
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